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NOTES
STATE LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO MANDATE
CONTINUATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS DURING BUSINESS CHANGE:
THE UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS AND
THE PRE-EMPTED RESULTS
ITRODUCTION
Corporate business combinations' are complex transactions.
Both buyers and sellers must analyze numerous issues that may ulti-
mately affect the business risks and financial returns of the resulting
organizations. One such issue is how to allocate the various obliga-
tions of the transacting parties, and how this allocation will affect
the execution of the transaction and the ultimate profitability of the
resulting organizations. The potential survivor will, of couse, con-
duct its own analysis and, as a result, may voluntarily assume some
obligations and explicitly disclaim others. The technical form of the
transaction is a key factor in this analysis because it may define the
allocation of, or preclude the avoidance of, many ordinary obliga-
tions. If, for example, the transaction is structured as a merger
rather than an acquisition many obligations are legally "assigned"
to the survivor regardless of attempts to avoid them.2
. Labor obligations, however, are not ordinary obligations. They
require a separate analysis that has typically followed the doctrines
developed by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the
1 This Note uses "business combination transaction," "business combination," or
"combinational transaction" to refer to statutory mergers, consolidations, and asset
sales.
2 See infra text accompanying note 12, notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
A business definition of a merger is "any transaction that forms one economic unit
from two or more previous ones." THOMAS E. COPELAND &J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL
THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 677 (1988). In essence, the owners of these separate
organizations pool their interests to form a single firm; and the previous owners of these
firms remain as owners of the survivor. DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS, Ac-
QUISrTIONS, AND REORGANIZATIONS 38 (1991). A businessperson's definition of an asset
.acquisition (or asset sale) is a "sale" in the lay sense of the word; after the transaction,
the shareholders of the "seller" have no ownership interest in the "acquiror." Id at 38-
39; COPELAND & WESTON, supra, at 678.
Legal definitions of a merger or an asset acquisition include transactions that strictly
comply with state corporate code sections which specifically define and control them.
This Note technically refers to mergers and acquisitions in the legal sense. Practically,
however, the businessperson's definitions may be perfectly suitable for understanding
the issues in this Note.
48 CORNELL L4 W REVIEW [Vol. 77:47
federal courts3 to specifically address labor obligations during and
after business combinations. 4 These doctrines focus not on the
technical form of the transaction but on the presence or absence of
"continuity" in the employment relationship. These doctrines re-
ject the "categorical" approach that is used to analyze other obliga-
tions, and attempt to balance the "rightful prerogative of owners to
independently rearrange their businesses" with "some protection to
the employees from a sudden change in the employment
relationship." 5
Recently, however, some states, including Delaware, Massachu-
setts, and Pennsylvania, have enacted legislation that deviates from
the balancing approach of federal doctrines. These statutes reject
both the categorical and balancing analyses in favor of a mandatory
continuation of collective bargaining agreements regardless of the
circumstances or effects. 6 This legislation represents a bold attempt
to reverse the federal balancing approach, and, if allowed to control
the allocation of labor obligations, will force significant and detri-
mental changes in the way corporations and businesses orchestrate
combinational transactions as well as the ways in which our society is
affected by such transactions.
This Note analyzes these recent state enactments. Section I
first reviews the federal doctrines regarding collective bargaining
agreements during business change. 7 It then presents the recent
state legislation and discusses how these enactments would change
the analysis and effects of the federal doctrines.8 Section II analyzes
3 The NLRB and the federal courts interpret and apply various national labor acts,
such as the Railway Labor Act (RLA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
The NLRB functions as the primary administrator of the NLRA by receiving and prose-
cuting charges of unfair labor practices. See BERNARD D. MELTZER & STANLEY D. HEN-
DERSON, LABOR LAW 69 (3d ed. 1985). If, after investigation, the NLRB decides that the
charges form a sufficient basis for a formal complaint, it will formally prosecute the com-
plaint. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAw 108-09 (11 th ed. 1991) [hereinafter Cox,
LABOR LAw]. Hearings on these complaints are held before an administrative law judge
appointed by the NLRB. Id. at 109. Unless exceptions are filed, the findings and recom-
mendations of the administrative law judge are adopted by the NLRB and included in an
NLRB order that dictates the actions the parties are to take. If exceptions are filed, the
NLRB reviews them and then issues a formal opinion and a corresponding order. These
orders are, at first, subject only to voluntary compliance. Id. at 11I. However, if the
parties do not voluntarily comply, the NLRB may petition a federal court of appeals for
an enforcement order, and, if necessary, the Supreme Court will review the court of
appeals' decision by writ of certiorari. Id. Through this process of hearings, orders, and
review, the NLRB and the federal courts work together to develop the federal doctrines
concerning labor related obligations.
4 See infra notes 22-137 and accompanying text.
5 John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
6 See inifra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
7 See mfra notes 22-137 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 138-71 and accompanying text.
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the underlying policies, the resulting effects, and the constitutional-
ity of these recent state enactments. This section argues that legisla-
tures should repeal these statutes because they fail to satisfy
legislative intent and because they negatively affect employees, busi-
nesses and society. 9 Further, Section II argues that courts should
declare these enactments unconstitutional because they intrude on
an area of federal power legitimately exercised by Congress under
the National Labor Relations Act.10
I
BACKGROUND
In planning for a business combination, acquirors must care-
fully consider the post-transaction duties and responsibilities flow-
ing from the predecessors' obligations because these duties and
responsibilities can easily develop into either very profitable assets
or very costly liabilities. Acquirors may voluntarily assume these ob-
ligations if they somehow represent positive net present value in-
vestments."' Alternatively, acquirors may attempt to explicitly avoid
obligations if they perceive them to be costly, negative net present
value liabilities. In certain situations, however, state law may pre-
vent acquirors from avoiding these obligations and may assign them
to the survivor by operation of law.
This legal assignment of ordinary obligations often depends on
the technical form of the transaction. In a merger, for example,
state corporate law typically assigns most, if not all, of the predeces-
sors' debts, liabilities and duties to the survivor.1 2 In an asset sale,
on the other hand, similar obligations are not assigned to the
buyer' 3 unless the transaction falls within one of four general excep-
9 See infra notes 172-275 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 276-325 and accompanying text.
11 In simple terms, investments are analyzed by summing the time discounted value
of all investment cash flows; both positive and negative, and both present and future.
When this sum is positive, the investment is referred to as a positive net present value
investment. This means that the investment will yield greater returns than the required
capital will "cost" (interest costs, opportunity costs, finance charges, holding costs, etc.).
See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 29-
43, 93-118, 235-250 (3d. ed. 1988). If obligations arising from an acquisition are neces-
sary for a successful business, the acquiror may find it financially attractive to assume
those obligations. Similarly, if those obligations will evolve into income producing "as-
sets," with positive future cash flows sufficient to outweigh the necessary investment
costs, the acquiror may find it financially attractive to assume those obligations. Nega-
tive net present investments are just the opposite. Their returns are insufficient to cover
the costs of capital. Obviously, acquirors will find these obligations unattractive.
12 See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
13 See 15 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 7122 (rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter FLETCHER, LAW OF PRIVATE CORP.]
("The general rule, which is well settled, is that where one company sells or otherwise
transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabili-
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tions. t4 With respect to ordinary obligations, then, acquirors can
predict their post-transaction liabilities solely on the basis of trans-
actional form. 15
Collective bargaining agreements, however, are not treated as
"ordinary contract[s]" 16 by either the NLRB or the federal courts.
ties of the transferor." (citing, inter alia, Conway v. White Motor Corp., 885 F.2d 90 (3d
Cir. 1989); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1988);
Shaw v. Republic Drill Corp., 810 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1987); Santa Maria v. Owens-Illi-
nois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848 (Ist Cir. 1986); MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Flintkote Co., 760
F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1985); Kline v.Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1984); United
Mine Workers v. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1984)).
14 The exceptions to the general rule are those situations when (1) the buyer ex-
pressly or impliedly assumes the other company's debts and obligations; (2) the transac-
tion is really a de facto merger; (3) the transaction was executed to fraudulently avoid
obligations; or (4) the acquiror is a mere continuation of the seller, i.e., a reorganization.
See FLETCHER, LAW OF PRIVATE CORP., supra note 13, § 7122; cf Golden State Botding
Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973):
[T]he general rule of corporate liability is that when a corporation sells
all of its assets to another, the latter is not responsible for the seller's
debts or liabilities, except where (1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly
agrees to assume the obligations; (2) the purchaser is merely a continua-
tion of the selling corporation; or (3) the transaction was entered into to
escape liability."
15 These rules are "form-dependent" because their obligations hinge on the techni-
cal form of the transaction, i.e., merger versus acquisition. See supra notes 13-14.
16 John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964). Though collective
bargaining agreements (or labor contracts) are similar to ordinary contracts in that they
define the signatory parties' relationship, the differences between the two are significant.
For purposes of this Note, the most important distinguishing feature is that labor con-
tracts are legal arrangements which regulate the tenure and terms of employment. They
are not, however, contracts of employment. Cox, LABOR LAw, supra note 3, at 740.
Labor contracts, unlike ordinary contracts, usually do not develop out of a relation-
ship of mutual self-interest; instead, they emerge from a hostile relationship compelled
and controlled by law. Id.; see also Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550 (collective bargaining agree-
ments are "not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship"). La-
bor contracts also look forward to an indefinite period of continued dealing. They
uniquely control the rights and duties of nonsignatories-the employees of some partic-
ular business. These rights and duties function as a general "code of regulations,"
rather than a mutual agreement regarding specific details. They continue to "evolve,"
even after formal execution through continued collective bargaining, grievances, and
settlements. Cox, LABOR LAw, supra note 3, at 741; see also Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550 (" 'The
collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship.'" (quoting United
States Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960))).
Labor contracts are also "peculiarly enmeshed in a framework of regulatory laws."
Particularly enmeshed are: federal labor legislation (NLRA, LMRA, RLA, etc.), deci-
sions and procedures of the NLRB and other administrative agencies, and state and
federal court decisions. Cox, LABOR LAw, supra note 3, at 741; see also Wiley, 376 U.S. at
550 (A labor agreement "'calls into being a new common law-the common law of a
particular industry or of a particular plant.' " (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578-
79)). These characteristics of labor contracts make them sufficiently different from ordi-
nary contracts for the NLRB and the courts to disregard ordinary contract principles
when deciding labor issues. Instead, the NLRB and the courts turn to distinct doctrines
that are based on "impressive policy considerations," such as balancing business needs
against employee expectations and avoiding industrial labor strife. Wiley, 376 U.S. at
549-50.
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Therefore, duties of the transacting parties with respect to the pred-
ecessors' labor obligations do not depend on transactional form.
Instead, allocation of labor obligations has typically been deter-
mined in accordance with the substance-dependent doctrines of the
NLRB and the federal courts.1 7 These federal doctrines employ
case-by-case factual inquiries18 and rely not on the technical form of
the transaction,19 but on the practical substance and findings of
"continuation" of the employing enterprise and the associated em-
ployment relationships.20 This "substance over form" analysis ex-
plicitly rejects the rigid approach used to evaluate ordinary
obligations, opting instead for a more equitable approach that bal-
ances the business needs of the employer with the social expecta-
tions of the employees.21 This background section reviews these
federal doctrines and presents the recent state legislative attempts
to supplant these federal doctrines with a more rigid state-by-state
approach.
A. The Federal Doctrines With Respect To Collective
Bargaining Agreements
In general, courts categorize corporate acquirors, for purposes
of labor obligations,22 as successor employers, continuing employ-
ers or completely separate employers.23 The labor relations obliga-
tions following a combinational transaction differ for each category.
Under the federal doctrines, successor employers must recognize
and bargain with the predecessors' unions only if they hire a major-
ity of their employees from the predecessors' work forces.24 Succes-
sor employers do not, however, have to assume the substantive
provisions of the predecessors' collective bargaining agreements
unless they explicitly or impliedly choose to do so. 25 Continuing
17 These doctrines hereinafter are referred to as the "federal doctrines."
18 See Fortress Pennsylvania, MERGERS & AcQUtsrrioNs, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 22 ("Pres-
ervation of contracts after acquisitions traditionally is a complex legal issue that often is
decided on a case-by-case basis.").
19 See Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l
Union, 417 U.S. 249, 257 (1974) ("[O]rdinarily there is no basis for distinguishing
among mergers, consolidations, or purchases of assets in the analysis of successorship
problems." (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 108, 182-83 n.5
(1973))).
20 See infra notes 103-25 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
22 "Acquirors" in this Note includes survivors of a merger or consolidation as well
as acquirors in an asset acquisition.
23 Charles I. Cohen, Corporate Restructuring Dilemmas, in COPING WITH CORPORATE
CHANGE: LABOR LAw ISSUES AFFECTING PLANT CLOSINGS,JOINT VENTURES, AcoUIsrriONS
AND OTHER CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 1-2 (1989).
24 See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 51-80 and accompanying text.
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employers, and comparable "alter egos" of the seller, must always
recognize and bargain with the union 26 and assume the substantive
terms and conditions of the predecessors' collective bargaining
agreements. 27 When successor, continuing employer, or alter ego
status is not warranted by the factual situation, new employers are
considered to be separate employers by default.28 Separate employ-
ers do not have to recognize or bargain with the predecessors' un-
ions and are not required to assume substantive provisions of the
predecessors' labor agreements.2 9
1. The Successorship Doctrine
The successorship doctrine is the most detailed and complex of
the federal labor obligation doctrines. Thus, this section devotes
particular attention to reviewing the criteria and effects of the suc-
cessorship doctrine. After presenting the factual findings required
by the NLRB and the courts to impute successor status, this section
reviews the effects that such successor status has on labor obliga-
tions arising in and from business combination transactions. Fi-
nally, this section establishes that successorship findings and
requirements do not depend solely on transactional form.
a. Successorship Criteria
Successorship analyses focus on "continuity" of the overall em-
ployment relationship. A new employer is considered a successor if
the employment environment and relationships existing after a busi-
ness combination transaction closely resemble those that existed
prior to the transaction. In Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v.
NLRB,30 for example, the Supreme Court held that a new employer
will be considered a successor to the previous employer if the em-
ployees would "understandably view their job situations as essen-
tially unaltered" 3' because of the "substantial continuity" existing
between the preacquisition and postacquisition enterprises. 32
In Fall River, the Sterlingwale Corporation operated a textile
dyeing and finishing plant. The corporation experienced financial
difficulties in the late 1970s and early 1980s 33 and in February,
26 See infra notes 102-23 and accompanying text.
27 Id.
28 "[I]n some cases changes to a business that is acquired through a stock transfer
may be so great that the resulting business is not even a 'successor.'" EPE, Inc. v.
NLRB, 845 F.2d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
29 Id. at 487.
30 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
31 Id. at 46.
32 Id. at 45.
33 Id. at 30-31.
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1982, laid off all its production workers.3 4 In the late summer of
1982, the company went out of business3 5 and assigned many of its
assets to its creditors. Its remaining assets were disposed of at a
liquidation auction,36 with the Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corpo-
ration purchasing many of these assets. In September of 1982, Fall
River used these assets to commence textile dyeing and finishing
operations very similar to Sterlingwale's previous operations.3 7 To
run these operations, Fall River hired some of Sterlingwale's previ-
ous employees, but refused to recognize or bargain with their old
union.38 In response, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge
alleging that Fall River's refusal to bargain was a violation of certain
National Labor Relations Act provisions.3 9
The Court held that Fall River was Sterlingwale's successor be-
cause of the substantial continuity between it and Sterlingwale.40
This continuity resulted from seven factors that remained essentially
unchanged between the two enterprises: the essential business in
which they were involved; the employees' jobs; the working condi-
tions; the supervisors; the machinery, equipment, and methods of
production; the manufactured product and offered services; and the
respective body of customers. 4' In particular, Fall River employees
worked on the "same machines" that they had worked on for
Sterlingwale and were supervised by the same supervisors that had
supervised them at Sterlingwale. 42 Additionally, Fall River did not
introduce new product lines and operated many of the same pro-
duction processes as Sterlingwale.43 In sum, the Court found that
Fall River was Sterlingwale's successor because of the "substantial
evidence" of enterprise continuity. 44
This generic type of successorship, however, arising merely
from enterprise continuity, does not by itself demand that pre-ex-
isting labor obligations be assigned to the successor. Obligations of
the successor relating to collective bargaining agreements depend
on the continuity of the whole employment relationship, including
34 Id at 31.
35 Id. at 32.
36 Id
37 Id
38 Id at 33.
39 Id. at 34.
40 Ide at 46.
41 Ide at 43 (citing NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 280 n.4 (1972);
Aircraft Magnesium, 265 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 (1982), enforced, 730 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.
1984); Premium Foods, 260 N.L.R.B. 708, 714 (1982), enforced, 709 F.2d 629 (9th Cir.
1983)).
42 Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 (1987).
43 Id
44 Id
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both enterprise continuity and work force continuity.45 In Fall River,
for example, the court found substantial continuity between both
the enterprises of Sterlingwale and Fall River and the work forces of
Sterlingwale and Fall River.46
Finding work force continuity, however, depends on a different
degree of continuity than does enterprise continuity. Whereas en-
terprise continuity exists when the two enterprises are essentially
the same, work force continuity exists not when its work force is
essentially the same as the predecessors' but when the new em-
ployer hires merely a majority of its employees from the predeces-
sors' work force.47 In this situation, a court applying the
successorship doctrine will deem the previous bargaining unit to
have sufficiently retained its substantive form, such that there exists
"substantial continuity in the identity of the work force."'48 Upon
finding both substantial work force continuity and essential enter-
prise continuity, courts conclude that employees could reasonably
view their job situations as "essentially unaltered." 49 Thus, in the
view of the courts, the previous bargaining unit should remain an
45 See G.W. Hunt, 258 N.L.R.B. 1198, 1200 (1981) (Even though all the other crite-
ria were satisfied, successorship did not attach since only four of the successor's nine
employees were hired from the predecessor's workforce); Cohen, supra note 23, at 5
("The fact that a new employer hires a majority of its employees from the predecessor is
a crucial requirement that must be satisfied to find successorship."); cf NLRB v. Jeffries
Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d 459, 464-65 (9th Cir. 1985) (Work force continuity, though
critically important, is insufficient by itself to support a finding of successorship.).
46 Fall River, 482 U.S. at 46-52.
47 See id. at 46; Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 684-86 & nn.2 & 3 (2d Cir.
1980); United Maintenance & Mfg. Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 529, 532-34 (1974); Spruce Up
Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194, 196 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975).
48 Saks & Co., 634 F.2d at 684 (quoting Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB,
549 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also Stewart Granite Enter., 255 N.L.R.B. 569, 573
(1981) (the mere fact that only a portion of the old bargaining unit is transferred to a
new owner does not defeat successorship obligations, as long as the transferred employ-
ees constitute a separate, appropriate unit and comprise a majority of the unit under the
new operation).
In Fall River, the Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's "substantial and representative
complement" rule which defines when the new employer's workforce will be analyzed to
determine work force continuity. Id. at 46-52. The five criteria of this rule are:
(1) whether the job classifications designated for the operation
"were filled or substantially filled;"
(2) whether the operation was in "normal or substantially normal
production;"
(3) the size of the complement [of workers] on the date of normal
production;
(4) the time expected to elapse before a substantially larger comple-
ment would be at work; and
(5) the relative certainty of the employer's expected expansion.
NLRB v. Jeffries Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Premium
Foods v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 1983)).
49 Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987) (quoting
Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973)).
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appropriate representative of the employees, and the new employer
is deemed a successor employer of that "continued" bargaining
unit.5 0
b. Successor Employers Have No Duty to Assume Substantive
Provisions of Collective Bargaining Agreements
Although a court may deem the new employer a successor, the
federal successorship doctrine does not require the new employer
to assume the substantive provisions of the predecessors' collective
bargaining agreements. In John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,51 the
Court held that mergers do not automatically extinguish or extend
the provisions of the predecessors' labor contracts because "a col-
lective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract governed
by ordinary merger doctrine." 52 Instead, under "appropriate cir-
cumstances" the union and the new employer must arbitrate
whether the labor agreements should extend to the successor.53
In Wiley, Interscience Publishers, Inc. planned to merge into
John Wiley & Sons. 4 Interscience and its union held premerger
discussions but could not agree on how the merger would affect
their collective bargaining agreement. 55 Interscience then merged
into Wiley and Wiley subsequently refused to recognize the union,
asserting that the merger terminated the bargaining agreement. 56
The union argued that the decision with respect to the agreement
should be submitted to arbitration 57 and the Supreme Court agreed
because of the "appropriate circumstances" of the case. First, the
transaction was a merger, and under the general rule for mergers, a
survivor is liable for the contracts of the predecessors. 58 Second,
the transaction was completed under New York law which provided
that "no 'claim or demand for any cause' against a constituent cor-
poration shall be extinguished" by a merger.5 9 Third, the operation
continued in substantially the same form despite the change in own-
ership.60 These three factors constituted the "appropriate circum-
stances" and the Court ordered Wiley to arbitrate with the union
with respect to the bargaining agreements. Thus, the Wiley Court
held that substantive provisions of the predecessors' collective bar-
50 Id at 41, 43.
51 376 U.S. 543 (1964).52 Id at 550.
53 Id at 548.
54 Id. at 545.
55 Id
56 Id
57 Id at 546.
58 Id. at 550 n.3.
59 Id at 547-48.
60 Id. at 551.
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gaining agreement do not automatically evaporate or extend to the
successor. Instead, they merely pass to the findings of arbitration
under "appropriate circumstances."
Cases subsequent to Wiley have narrowed its holding so that
successors need not assume the substantive provisions of the prede-
cessors' collective bargaining agreements unless they explicitly or
impliedly agree to do so. In NLRB v. Burns International Security Serv-
ices, Inc.,61 the Wackenhut Corporation had a contract to provide
plant security to the Lockheed Aircraft Services Company.62 This
contract was about to expire, and Lockheed requested various com-
panies to submit bids with respect to a follow-on contract.63 Lock-
heed selected Burns International Security Services, Inc. which
assumed the responsibility for protection services. 64 Burns chose to
retain twenty-seven Wackenhut employees, without voluntarily as-
suming their collective-bargaining agreement, who with fifteen of
Burns's own employees transferred in from other locations then
comprised the Bums workforce serving Lockheed. 65 Burns later re-
fused to observe the terms of the Wackenhut collective-bargaining
agreement 66 and the union filed unfair labor practice charges with
the NLRB. 67 In resolving the dispute, the Supreme Court modified
Wilev and held that a successor has no obligation to assume the sub-
stantive provisions of the predecessors' collective-bargaining con-
tract when the successor neither agreed to, nor implied an intention
to, assume the contract.68
Two years later, in Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local, Hotel and
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union,69 the Court reaf-
firmed the Burns holding and extended it to situations in which the
predecessors' labor contracts contain successorship clauses.70 In
Howard Johnson, the Howard Johnson Company purchased substan-
tially all of the assets of a restaurant and a motor lodge owned by
Grissom.7 1 The Grissom employees were covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements that included generic "successors and assigns"
clauses. 72 Prior to official transfer of the operations, Howard John-
61 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
62 Id. at 274.
63 Id. at 275.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 275-76.
67 Id. at 276.
68 Id. at 281.
69 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
70 Id. at 258 n.3.
71 Id. at 250.
72 id. at 251. The agreements "provided that they would be binding upon the em-
ployer's 'successors, assigns, purchasers, lessees or transferees.' " Id.
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son explicitly refused to recognize both Grissom's union and any
obligations resulting from Grissom's labor agreements. 73 Subse-
quently, Howard Johnson hired only a small fraction of the Grissom
employees74 and the union filed suit, alleging that Howard Johnson
violated the terms of the Grissom collective-bargaining agreements
by failing to hire all of the employees.7 5 The union requested the
court to order Howard Johnson and Grissom to arbitrate the extent
of their obligations to the old employees under the bargaining
agreement.7 6 The Supreme Court, reaffirming Burns, held that the
union could not bind a successor to the substantive provisions of the
contract, particularly when the new employer had explicitly refused
to assume that obligation,77 and could not compel the successor to
arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the former employees.7 8
Recently, the Supreme Court, in Fall River Dyeing and Finishing
Corp. v. NLRB,79 reaffirmed both Burns and Howard Johnson by hold-
ing that successors are not bound to the substantive provisions of
their predecessors' collective-bargaining agreements.80 Thus, even
though successor employers may have some obligations with respect
to their predecessors' employment relationships, they do not have
an obligation to assume the substantive provisions of collective bar-
gaining agreements to which they were not a party.
c. Successors Have No Duty to Hire the Predecessors' Employees
but They May Have a Duty to Bargain With the
Predecessors' Unions
Even though successors do not have to assume the predeces-
sors' collective bargaining provisions, they must bargain with the
predecessors' unions8 1 if the courts find "substantial continuity of
identity in the business enterprise."8 2 As the Court explained in
Fall River, this substantial continuity depends principally on the ac-
quiror's post-transaction hiring decisions:
[To a substantial extent the... [obligation to bargain] ... rests in
the hands of the successor. If the new employer makes a con-
75 Id at 251-52.
74 Id at 252.
75 Id at 252.
76 Id at 252-53.
77 Id.
78 Id at 265.
79 482 U.S. 27 (1987). See supra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
80 Id at 40.
81 See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 41; NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 287
(1972).
82 Howard Johnson, Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l
Union, 417 U.S. 249, 259 (1974) (quoting John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543, 551 (1964)).
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scious decision to maintain generally the same business and to
hire a majority of its employees from the predecessor, then the
bargaining obligation of [the NLRA] is activated. This makes
sense when one considers that the employer intends to take advan-
tage of the trained workforce of its predecessor.83
As the Court explained in Burns, the source of the bargaining obliga-
tion is not the collective-bargaining agreement itself but the contin-
ued existence of a recognized bargaining unit.8 4
The successorship doctrine also permits acquirors to choose
whether to hire the predecessors' employees and on what terms. In
Howard Johnson, for example, the Court held that "the employees of
the terminating employer have no legal right to continued employ-
ment with the new employer." 85 Similarly, in Burns, the Court held
that "a successor employer is ordinarily free to set the initial terms"
of employment without bargaining with the union unless it is "clear
that the new employer plans to retain all of the [predecessors'] em-
ployees" and the bargaining unit would otherwise remain an appro-
priate representative of the employees.8 6 In Fall River, the Court
reaffirmed this holding, stating that a successor is "ordinarily free to
set initial terms" on which it will hire employees. 87 It is only after
they are hired that new employees may organize another bargaining
unit, or join the new employer's existing bargaining unit, to negoti-
ate with the new employer over the terms of their employment.
d. Effects of the Form of the Transaction
Transactional form usually affects the assignment of ordinary
obligations, 88 but commentators disagree whether transactional
form influences the criteria and effects of the successorship doc-
trine.89 Some commentators argue that form still plays an impor-
tant role in the analysis and that survivors under mergers and stock
acquisitions have to assume obligations that purchasers under asset
83 Fall River, 482 U.S. at 41.
84 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 284-287, 292; see also Carter v. CMTA-Molders & Allied
Health & Welfare Trust, 736 F.2d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The duty to bargain
arises when 'the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees
hired by the new employer are represented by a certified bargaining agent.'" (quoting
NLRB v. Edjo, Inc., 631 F.2d 604, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1980))).
85 417 U.S. at 264; see also id. at 261 ("[Ain employer.. . 'who purchases the assets
of a business [is not] obligated to hire all of the employees of the predecessor though it
is possible that such an obligation might be [voluntarily] assumed by the employer.'"
(quoting Burns, 460 U.S. at 280 n.5.)).
86 406 U.S. at 294-95.
87 482 U.S. at 40 (quoting Burns, 406 U.S. at 294).
88 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
89 Transactional form is controlling with respect to most obligations. See supra note
13 and infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
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acquisitions do not.90 Other commentators argue that transactional
form is unimportant and that notions of continuity or competing
equity control.91
This argument focuses on the holdings of Wiley, Burns, and
Howard Johnson.92 In Wiley, the Court's holding that mergers do not
necessarily extinguish all rights under a labor contract implied that
mergers would generate different labor obligations than would asset
acquisitions. 93 In Burns, however, the Court seemed to hold that it
was improper to bind any new employer to the substantive terms of
a collective-bargaining agreement.9 Thus, a narrow reading of
these cases leaves room for argument that successorship obligations
depend on transactional form. This analysis, however, disregards
the substantive reasoning of the Court.
In Wiley, for example, the Court did not hold that the form of
the transaction would determine the obligations of the new em-
ployer. Instead, it relied on a combination of factors that tipped the
balance in favor of requiring the survivor to arbitrate with the
union.95 If the form of the transaction were controlling, the Court
would not have had to rely on the other factors that it considered
important. Furthermore, it would not have decided that the succes-
sor's assumption of labor agreements was contingent on arbitration.
In Burns, the Court explicitly stated that both employers and
unions "are free from having contract provisions imposed upon
them against their will,"' 96 implying that all new employers are enti-
tled to this "freedom," regardless of the transactional form. Burns,
90 See Marvin Dicker, Sale of Assets, Mergers, and Acquisitions: A Management View, in
LABOR LAw AND BusINEss CHANGE: THEOREICAL AND TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 172
(Samuel Estreicher & Daniel G. Collins eds. 1988) ("The purchaser of the assets, as
opposed to the stock, of a business is normally not required to assume or adopt the
seller's existing labor agreement."); see also Samuel Estreicher, Successorship Obligations, in
LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE, supra, at 71 ("The federal labor law governing the
successorship obligation of a purchaser of the assets of a business provides, with clarity
unusual in this area, that a purchaser is ordinarily not legally obligated to assume the
seller's collective-bargaining agreement.").
91 See Zachary D. Fasman & Keith Fischler, Labor Relations Consequences of Mergers and
Acquisitions, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 14, 25-26 (1987).
[I]n most cases, it will be competing equities, and not the form of the
transaction, that will determine labor-related liabilities.... [Tihe form of
the transaction, logically and legally, should be irrelevant.... The suc-
cessorship inquiry thus turns on the 'essential' nature of the new busi-
ness, and the corporate formalities by which the change is accomplished
should not signify [sic].
ld
92 See supra notes 51-77 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
95 John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547-48, 550 n.3, 551 (1964); see
supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
96 NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972).
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however, involved neither a merger nor an asset acquisition, but
merely a "substitution" of a new entity to provide follow-on services
to an expiring business contract.97 The Court's discussion of new
employer "freedom," therefore, may be dicta with respect to actual
mergers or acquisitions. The disagreement concerning the effects
of transactional form hinges on the scope of the holding in Burns.
Subsequently, in Howard Johnson, the Court provided some clar-
ification. The narrow holding of Howard Johnson was that an asset
acquiror need not assume the substantive terms of the predecessors'
collective bargaining agreements. 98 The Court, however, explicitly
stated that transactional form does not control.99 The Court distin-
guished Wiley by noting that the surviving corporation in Wiley had
hired all of the employees of the disappearing corporation, whereas
the acquiror in Howard Johnson had not.100 Thus, the Court implied
that the major criteria of the successorship analysis is work force
continuity, 10 1 and that transactional form alone does not control
successorship obligations.102
2. The Continuing Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines
In most cases, the NLRB and the federal courts apply the suc-
cessorship analysis described above, regardless of the type of trans-
actions creating the new employer. In some situations, however, the
courts do not apply the successorship doctrine, but instead deem
the new employer to be a "continuing employer" bound to the
terms and obligations of the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreements. 10 3 Under this theory, the survivor is, in effect, the
"same corporation" as the predecessor, 10 4 "unaltered" by the busi-
ness transaction. 10 5 In EPE, Inc. v. NLRB, 106 for example, Echlin
97 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
99 417 U.S. at 257 ("We have recognized that ordinarily there is no basis for distin-
guishing among mergers, consolidations, or purchases of assets in the analysis of succes-
sorship problems .. " (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182-83,
n.5 (1973))).
100 Id. at 258-59.
101 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
102 See also Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,44 n.10 (1987)
("[T]he way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not
determinative.").
103 EPE, Inc. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Fasman & Fischler,
supra note 91, at 26 ("In these circumstances, the business continues unchanged and
remains bound to existing collective bargaining agreements because there has been no
'essential change in the business that would have affected employee attitudes toward
representation.' ") (quoting Premium Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 623, 627 (9th Cir.
1983)).
104 EPE, 845 F.2d at 488.
105 Id. at 487.
106 845 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1988).
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acquired EPE through a stock acquisition.10 7 After the acquisition,
EPE continued as an independent corporate entity and retained its
plant manager, plant employees, and supervisors.' 08 New machin-
ery was subsequently added to the operations of EPE, and minor
changes were made to the product lines, but the business operations
were otherwise unchanged. 10 9 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that Echlin was a "continuing employer,"' " 0 not a suc-
cessor, because the "new" employer was not a "new corporate en-
tity" and no employees were terminated through any hiatus of
operations."' Essentially, the continuing employer doctrine repre-
sents a "substance over form" analysis, for which a mere change of
"substantial ownership," through a stock sale, for example, does not
invoke successorship analysis. 1 2 Instead, the business is deemed
"unchanged" and bound to the prior and continuing labor
agreements 113
Similarly, the courts disregard the successorship doctrine when
the new employer is really an "alter ego" of the old corporation." 14
The "alter ego" doctrine with respect to labor obligations arises
when business combination transactions are undertaken not for
some legitimate business purpose, 115 but merely to disguise sub-
stantially identical ownership" 16 in order to avoid the obligations of
107 Id. at 486.
108 Id
109 leL
110 1& at 488.
I11 Id. at 489.
112 See Fasman & Fischler, supra note 91, at 25-26.
115 See EPE, 845 F.2d at 490.
114 "Alter ego" typically refers to the doctrine wherein a court disregards a corpo-
rate entity to hold an individual responsible for "acts knowingly and intentionally done
in the name of the corporation." BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 77 (6th ed. 1990). With
labor obligations, alter ego status is commonly applied when a new employer is
"'merely a disguised continuance of the old employer.'" C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical
Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350, 354 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Southport Petro-
leum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942)).
115 See Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942); NLRB v. Tricor
Products, 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d
783, 786 (3d Cir. 1979).
116 Three elements are required for alter ego status: complete domination by the
survivor of the finances, policy, and business practices of the two enterprises; fraud or
intention to perpetrate a violation of statutory or other legal duty; and resulting harm.
United Steelworkers of America v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1507 (11 th Cir.)
(citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, 439 F.Supp. 610, 618
(D.Me. 1977)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1988); see also NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc.,
780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (An intent to evade collective bargaining obligations
is one relevant factor to be considered by the NLRB along with substantially identical
management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and
ownership); but see J.M. Tanaka Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir.
1982) (The central inquiry is common control of labor relations, not common
ownership).
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collective bargaining agreements 1 7 or labor laws."" In Central
States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Sloan, 1 9 for exam-
ple, Sloan Excavating (Excavating) executed a collective bargaining
agreement with Local 26 of the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, under which Excavating agreed to pay pension contributions
to Central States on behalf of Excavating's three covered employ-
ees. 120 Soon thereafter, Excavating felt that it "couldn't stay in busi-
ness under that contract" and transferred the three employees, and
some of its equipment, to a new company it had formed called Sloan
Enterprises. 12 1 The district court held that the continuity of the or-
ganizations and the admitted intent to evade labor obligations, even
though reasonably motivated by a desire to save the company and
the jobs of its employees, was enough to deem Sloan Enterprises the
alter ego of Excavating.' 22 Like the continuing employer doctrine,
the alter ego doctrine emphasizes substance over form and binds
the "new" employer to all of the terms, conditions, and obligations
of the "old" employers' collective bargaining agreements.' 23
In summary, when the new employer is actually a mere continu-
ation or alter ego of the old employers, the obligations of the old
employment relationship continue to bind the successor. If the em-
ployer is not a mere continuation or alter ego, the courts apply the
successorship analysis. When none of these categories apply, the
court will consider the new employer a separate employer with no
obligations to the predecessors' bargaining units.124 Thus, in a truly
117 See C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350, 354 (1st
Cir. 1990) (" 'The focus of the alter ego doctrine... is on the existence of a disguised
continuance of a former business entity or an attempt to avoid the obligations of a col-
lective bargaining agreement.' ") (quoting Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18,
29 (1st Cir. 1983)); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Sloan, 714 F. Supp. 943, 946 (N.D. Il1. 1989) ("The intent to avoid labor obligations is
the linchpin of the alter ego doctrine."), aft'd, 902 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1990).
118 See Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 417 U.S.
249, 259 n.5 (1974) ("Such operation might have continued under ... a disguise in-
tended to evade this provision [of the NLRA]." (citing Southport Petroleum Co. v.
NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942))); NLRB v. Tricor Products, 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th
Cir. 1980).
119 714 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
120 Id. at 944-45.
121 Id. at 945.
122 Id. at 947.
123 See NLRB v. Tricor Products 636 F.2d, 266, 269-70 (10th Cir. 1980) ("A second
employer who is found to be the alter ego of the first employer... is bound by an agree-
ment between the union and the first employer."); Sturdevant Sheet Metal & Roofing
Co. v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1980) (Alter ego employers must recognize the
predecessors' unions and adhere to and work under the predecessors' collective bar-
gaining agreements); see also Cohen, supra note 23, at 23 ("Transactions ... involving
few operating changes are likely to obligate the buyer not only to recognize the union,
but also to honor its contract.").
124 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
- .-. ~
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new employment relationship, where the employees could not view
their situation as "essentially unaltered,"1 25 the federal doctrines
allow the new employer and employees to establish their own em-
ployment relationship that is truly appropriate and independently
negotiated. The federal doctrines demonstrate the NLRB and the
federal courts' position that some business combination transac-
tions require "carryover" of labor obligations, while others do not.
This ability of the federal doctrines to deal equitably with individual
situations provides benefits that a more rigid, categorically-defined
or broader-reaching statutory arrangement would not.
3. The Benefits of the Federal Doctrines
Application of the federal doctrines provides at least three ma-
jor benefits to those directly involved and to society in general: an
equitable balancing of economic and social interests, a promotion of
national consistency, and an internalization of otherwise external la-
bor concerns during acquisition negotiations. The Supreme Court,
in its four major decisions in this area, focused on the need to bal-
ance the business prerogatives of employers with the expected pro-
tections of employees.1 26 Employers must be able to implement
competitive business changes, while employees must be protected
from employers' disingenuous efforts to avoid their contractual la-
bor obligations. The federal doctrines provide employers with the
freedom to conduct business combination transactions, even if do-
ing so results in the discontinuation of substantive collective bar-
gaining provisions. In return, however, the new employer may have
to bargain or even arbitrate with the employees' union if the new
employment situation effectively "continues" the previous employ-
ment environment and relationships.1 27 Furthermore, if the trans-
action is a fraudulent attempt to avoid labor obligations, or
represents a mere transfer of ownership with no substantive change
to the business, the alter ego and continuing employer doctrines
125 Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 46 (1987); See supra
notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
126 SeeJohn Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964) ("The objectives
of national labor policy, reflected in established principles of federal law, require that
the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses and even
eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some protection to the employees
from a sudden change in the employment relationship."); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 285-88 (1972) (acknowledging the interest of the successor in free-
dom to structure its business, and the interest of the employees in continued
representation by the union); HowardJohnson, Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees &
Bartenders Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 264 (1974) ("[P]rotection afforded [to] employee
interests in a change of ownership ... is to bd reconciled with the new employer's right
to operate the enterprise with his own independent labor force); Fall River, 482 U.S. at
39-40 (citing and reaffirming the premises of Wt/y, Burns, and Howard Johnson, supra).
127 See supra notes 57-60, 68, 77-78, 80-102 and accompanying text.
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will ensure continuation of the preexisting labor agreements,
thereby protecting the employees. 128 Thus, the employer can con-
duct legitimate business transactions, while the employees retain a
balancing measure of protection.
The federal doctrines also provide a means for maintaining na-
tional consistency with respect to labor obligations by essentially
disregarding state law or procedures that would alter the federal
analysis. In Wiley, for example, the Court recognized the "back-
ground of state law"' 129 that seemed to require the continuation of
contractual obligations, but held that "federal law... controls"' 3 0
and "state law may be utilized [only] so far as it is of aid in the devel-
opment of correct principles or their application in a particular
case."'131 The federal doctrines that evolved after Wiley focused on
continuity of the employment relationship and disregarded state law
when that law would alter the continuity analysis. The result is uni-
form treatment of labor obligations throughout the nation. Na-
tional uniformity in the establishment and treatment of labor
obligations is one of the basic cornerstones of the NLRA, 132 and the
development and evolution of the federal doctrines have preserved
this congressional design.
Another benefit of the federal doctrines is that they force em-
ployers to consider otherwise "external" labor interests in their
business combination negotiations. In general, externalities may
arise from business combination transactions that are structured to
maximize divisible financial gains without accounting for the full so-
cial costs inflicted on outside interests.1 33 With respect to labor ob-
ligations, the primary parties to the business transaction could easily
impose costs on third party employees by agreeing to a transactional
structure that would result in lostjobs or wages, merely to make the
deal more profitable or to provide extra, divisible "bounty." Labor
would suffer from these externalities were it not for legal checks on
this type of behavior. The federal doctrines minimize this behavior
in four ways: by disregarding transactional form; 34 applying the
continuing employer doctrine to avoid inequitable discontinuance
of labor agreements; 35 applying the alter ego doctrine to prevent
fraudulent avoidance of labor agreements; 136 or applying the suc-
128 See supra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
129 See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257 (quoting Burns, 406 U.S. at 286).
130 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548.
'3' Id.
132 See infra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
133 See OESTERLE, supra note 2, at 156-57.
134 See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 77:47
NOTE-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
cessorship doctrine to prevent a disregard of employees' bargaining
rights. 137 The federal doctrines force acquirors either to continue
the employees' bargaining agreement or to bargain with the em-
ployees' union when the equities of the transaction so demand.
Since these mandates will eventually affect the overall profitability of
the transaction, the acquisition parties are economically "forced" to
bring labor considerations into their negotiations. Through this
mechanism, the federal doctrines force employers to consider other-
wise external labor interests during acquisition negotiations.
Thus, the federal doctrines provide workable and equitable
methods for dealing with labor obligations during business combi-
nations through a nationally consistent equation that balances the
economic and social effects of business combinations and internal-
izes otherwise external labor interests. These doctrines equally con-
sider both business and labor interests by recognizing the realities
of both the business environment and the employment relationship.
These benefits would be lost if the federal doctrines were aban-
doned for a more rigid approach.
B. State Law
Despite the benefits of the federal doctrines, some state legisla-
tures and judiciaries have attempted to deviate from this approach.
This section discusses two areas where the states have attempted
such departures. First, this section analyzes older state-code merger
statutes, and how these statutes have been used to analyze labor ob-
ligations in business combination transactions.1 3 8 Second, this sec-
tion presents the most recent state legislative efforts to structure a
new approach to labor obligations in business combination transac-
tions and discusses how these statutes attempt to change the face of
labor and acquisitions law.' 3 9
1. State Merger Statutes and their Application to Collective
Bargaining Agreements
After a merger, the survivor generally assumes most, if not all,
of the predecessors' debts, contracts, and liabilities. 140 Many states
have codified versions of this rule, including New York,' 4 1 Califor-
nia, 142 and the three states that have enacted the recent legislation
137 See supra notes 51-87 and accompanying text.
138 See infra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
.139 See infra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
140 SeeJohn Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,550 n.3 (1964) ("[I]n the case
of a merger ... the [survivor] is liable for the debts and contracts of the [predecessor]."
(citing FLETCHER, LAw OF PRIVATE CORP., supra note 13, at § 7121 (perm. ed.))).
141 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 906(b)(3) (Consol. 1983).
142 CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107(a) (West 1988).
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which is the focus of this note: Delaware, Massachusetts, and Penn-
sylvania.1 43 No state, however, has extended this principle to asset
sales, and these transactions are still governed by the general rule of
nonassumption and its associated exceptions.' 44
Prior to the full development of the successorship doctrine,
some state courts broadly interpreted the merger statutes as apply-
ing to collective bargaining agreements just as they would apply to
ordinary contracts and obligations. In Fitzsimmons v. Western Airlines,
Inc., 145 for example, Western Airlines agreed to merge into Ameri-
can Airlines, and American announced that upon completion of the
merger it would refuse to recognize Western's collective bargaining
agreement with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
146
The union filed a complaint in the Delaware Chancery Court against
both Western and American, seeking a declaratory judgment that its
collective bargaining agreement would pass to American upon com-
pletion of the merger.1 47 The airlines moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, arguing that American had no statutory duty to
assume the agreement.' 48
In denying the motion, the Fitzsimmons court* drew support from
the narrow holding of the Supreme Court's decision in John Wiley &
Sons v. Livingston.149 In Wiley, the Supreme Court considered a New
York merger statute to be one factor in its decision to compel arbi-
tration over the survivor's duty to assume a collective bargaining
agreement.' 50 In Fitzsimmons, the chancery court noted that Dela-
ware had a similar merger statute and, quoting the holding of Wiley,
stated that "the disappearance by merger.., does not automatically
terminate all rights of the employees." 15' The Chancery Court held
that Delaware's "statute [was] broad and certainly [did] not exclude
from its purview a duty arising from a contract with a union,"' 152 and
143 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1988); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 156, § 46C (Law.
Co-op. 1979); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1929(B) (1990); see also MIcH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 450.1724 (West Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 11.50(a)(3) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-6(e) (West 1969); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.82(A)(4) (Anderson Supp. 1990); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-114(e)
(1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.450(3) (Vernon'1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1106(3)
(Supp. 1990).
144 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
145 290 A.2d 682 (Del. Ch. 1972).
146 Id. at 684.
147 Id. Plaintiffs also sought damages and injunctive relief.
148 Id. at 684-85.
149 376 U.S. 543 (1964). See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
150 Wi/ey, 376 U.S. at 547-48; see supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
151 Fitzsimmons, 290 A.2d at 685 (quoting Wiley, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964)).
152 Id. at 685.
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denied the motion to dismiss. 153
The holding in Wiley, however, does not support an argument
that merger statutes mandate the assumption of labor agreements.
Because the Supreme Court's decision relied on numerous factors,
the most important of which was "continuity,"5 Wiley stands for
the proposition that such a statute does not control, but merely
"suggests [that assuming the agreements] may have been fairly
within the reasonable expectations of the parties."1 55 After Wiley,
the successorship doctrine came to rely on "continuity," rather than
the presence or absence of a state statute, to determine subsequent
labor obligations.1 56 The broad holdings of the Supreme Court in
Burns, Howard Johnson, and Fall River seem to reverse the holding of
the Delaware Chancery Court in Fitzsimmons,' 57 and no courts have
applied the merger statutes to collective bargaining agreements
subsequent to the full development of the successorship doctrine.15 8
At this point in time, these statutes do not, and should not, factor
into judicial decisions regarding the imposition of collective bar-
gaining agreements onto unwilling survivors.
2. Recent State Legislative Developments
Recently, three state legislatures have enacted provisions re-
quiring new employers to assume the substantive provisions of the
predecessors' collective bargaining agreements, regardless of "suc-
. cessorship" or "continuity."' 159 Delaware moved first when, in
1988, it enacted legislation mandating that "no merger, consolida-
tion, sale of assets or business combination shall result in the termi-
nation or impairment of the provisions of any labor contract
covering persons engaged in employment in this State and negoti-
ated by a labor organization or by a collective bargaining agent or
other representative."' 60 This legislation broadly encompasses the
whole gamut of business transactions: "'Business combination' in-
dudes any merger, consolidation, joint venture, lease, sale, dividend
153 ME at 689.
154 Miley, 376 U.S. at 551; see supra notes 51-60, 95 and accompanying text.
155 HowardJohnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union,
417 U.S. 249, 257 (1974).
156 Federal courts and the NLRB usually either disregard state law in this area or
apply it only to the extent that it furthers what is considered to be "the right policy." See
supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 51-102, 129-32 and accompanying text.
158 If these statutes were applied to collective bargaining agreements, they would
arguably be pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) under the author-
ity of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See infra notes 276-325 and accom-
panying text.
159 These statutes are hereinafter referred to as "collective-bargaining provisions,"
"recent state enactments," "recent enactments," or simply "enactments."
160 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 706(a) (Supp. 1990).
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exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer or other disposition (in one
transaction or a series of transactions) whether with a subsidiary or
otherwise."' 61  In 1989, Massachusetts enacted similar legisla-
tion,162 and Pennsylvania recently followed suit by including such a
provision in its now famous antitakeover package of 1990.163 Both
the Massachusetts and the Pennsylvania statutes include not only
many of the transactions listed in the Delaware statute but also "any
transfer of a controlling interest in such business operation."' 1 4
Although these recent enactments seem similar to the general
merger statutes, 165 they are actually quite different. First, the gen-
eral merger statutes apply only to mergers, while the recent enact-
ments encompass all types of business combination transactions.
No matter how a transaction is structured, the recent statutes deem
the acquiror to have "assumed" the substantive provisions of the
predecessors' labor contracts. Second, the general merger statutes
codified a widely accepted principle that the survivor to a merger is
responsible for many of the predecessor's obligations. 166 The re-
161 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 706(b)(1) (1988).
162 MASs. ANN. LAwS ch. 149 § 20E (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). Section 20E states, in
pertinent part, that:
No business combination transaction shall result in the termifiation or
impairment of the provisions of any labor contract covering persons en-
gaged in employment in the commonwealth negotiated by a labor organi-
zation or by a collective bargaining agent or other representative.
Notwithstanding such business combination transaction, such labor con-
tract shall continue in effect until its termination date or until otherwise
agreed upon by the parties to such contract or their successors ...
"Business combination transaction" [is defined as] any merger or consol-
idation, sale, lease, exchange or other disposition, in one transaction or a
series of transactions, whether of all or substantially all the property and
assets, including its good will, of the business operations that are the sub-
ject of the labor contract referred to in the first paragraph or any transfer
of a controlling interest in such business operations.
163 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2587 (1991).
164 Id. Section 2587 of the Pennsylvania statute specifically provides that:
No business combination transaction shall result in the termination or
impairment of the provisions of any covered labor contract, and the con-
tract shall continue in effect pursuant to its terms until it is terminated
pursuant to any termination provision contained therein, or until other-
wise agreed upon by the parties to such contract or their successors.
The term "covered labor contract" is defined as:
any labor contract if such contract: (1) covers persons engaged in the
employment in this commonwealth; (2) was negotiated by a labor organi-
zation or by a collective bargaining agent or other representative; (3) re-
lates to a business operation that was owned by the registered
corporation (or any subsidiary thereof) at the time of the control-share
approval with respect to such corporation; and (4) was in effect and cov-
ered such business operation and such employees at the time of such con-
trol-share approval.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2586 (1991).
165 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
166 SeeJohn Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 n.3 (1964) (For mergers,
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cent statutes, however, actually reverse the principles that apply to
all transactions other than mergers; the recent statutes, for example,
reverse the general rule of nonassumption in asset acquisitions. 167
Third, whereas the general merger statutes apply broadly to "obli-
gations," the recent statutes focus exclusively on collective bargain-
ing agreements. Thus, while the merger statutes could be
interpreted and applied by the courts to include or exclude specific
categories of obligations, the recent statutes cannot, and the only
"obligations" covered by these statutes are those arising from col-
lective bargaining agreements. 168
The recent statutes change the whole environment of combina-
tional transactions with respect to collective bargaining agreements
and labor obligations. These statutes seem to negate the federal
doctrines because they force new employers to assume substantive
provisions of labor agreements in total disregard of the underlying
considerations of each of the federal doctrines. 169 The state statutes
eliminate the benefits of the federal doctrines in balancing equities
and promoting national consistency170 and while beneficial to some
employees, are highly detrimental to others. 1 1
II
ANALYSIS
The judicial doctrines discussed above analyze the passage of
labor obligations during combinational transactions in light of the
equitable demands of the particular situation and in pursuit of a
broad balance between potentially competing social and economic
interests. The recent state enactments, however, pursue totally dif-
ferent goals. These constitutionally questionable statutes were en-
acted to protect certain subsections of organized labor, to prevent
many corporate combinations, or both, regardless of the impact on
social and economic interests. This section argues that these recent
state enactments not only yield unintended, detrimental results, 172
but also are pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution as an infringement on federal power as exer-
the generally accepted principle is that the survivor is responsible for the predecessors'
obligations.) (citing FLETCHER, LAW OF PRIVATE CORP., supra note 13, at § 7121 (1961
rev. ed.)).
167 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
168 This factor is particularly relevant in assessing how these statutes fulfill their mo-
tivating intentions. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
170 Id.
171 See infra notes 205-14 and accompanying text.
172 See infra notes 174-275 and accompanying text.
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cised by Congress under the NLRA. 173
A. The Recent Enactments Yield Unintended and Detrimental
Results
This subsection analyzes the effectiveness of the recent state
statutes in achieving their two implicit goals: labor protection and
takeover prevention. The Pennsylvania statute, as part of a general
package of statutory revision targeted at takeover activity, provides
evidence of these motivations. 174 The proponents of the act cited
two policies. First, the Pennsylvania legislature wanted to avoid
"such perceived harmful effects of hostile corporate takeovers as job
losses and plant closings."' 75 Second, the legislature wanted to en-
hance efficiency by promoting a business environment where man-
agers could focus on day-to-day business decisions. without worrying
about outside attacks from corporate raiders.' 76 This section argues
that the actual legislation enacted is ineffective t6 achieve either of
these goals.
1. Labor Protection
In protecting labor, legislators typically refer to three interests:
community stability, employee expectations, and unions and union
management. In fact, antitakeover legislation quite often explicitly
declares as its purpose the preservation of local jobs, economies,
communities, and cultural and charitable values, as well as the assur-
ance of fairer treatment of resident shareholders.177 Even when leg-
173 See infra notes 276-325 and accompanying text.
174 See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
175 Justin P. Klein and Jeffrey P. Greenbaum, Companies Cool Toward Anti-Takeover
Law, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 10, 1990, at 5; see also Hearings on Senate Bill No. 1310 before the
Pennsyhania House of Rep., Business and Commerce Comm., 174th Leg., Reg. Sess. 1-51
(1990) [hereinafter Hearings on Senate Bill No. 1310](various witnesses testifying how the
enactment would help preserve Pennsylvania jobs).
176 See Steven M.H. Wallman & Liran A. Gordon, Pennsylvania's Anti-Raider Legislation,
INSIGiHTS, August 1990, at 38.
The purpose of the Act is to permit companies subject to its provisions to
engage in long-term planning and to pursue long-term strategies in an
environment less susceptible to financial manipulation. The expectation
is that these companies will ... [be better able to compete against foreign
companies that] operate on a long-term as opposed to a short-term
perspective.
Many commentators, however, argue that such a viewpoint is in itself short-sighted be-
cause the threat of a corporate takeover promotes efficient long-term management, not
short-term expedience. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
177 See George C. Hook, What is Wrong with Takeover Legislation, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
293 (1988); see also Hearings on Senate Bill No. 1310, supra note 175, at 1-311 (various
witnesses discussing the labor and community protection motivations for the Penn-
sylvania enactment); RONALDJ. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE Acouist-
TIONS 1059-60 (1986); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and
The Role of The States. 1988 Wis. L. Rpv. 491, 499 ("I am convinced that many at the state
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islation is designed to provide other benefits, such as the
maximization of target shareholder value, some commentators ar-
gue that the actual, unstated motivation is often labor protection. 178
The general public perception is that business combination transac-
tions, especially hostile takeovers, hurt labor179and protecting labor
is, therefore, an understandable motivation for antitakeover legisla-
tion. Such legislation, however, if not restrained, may become pro-
tectionism which is typically both inefficient and unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause.18 0 This is especially true when the as-
sumption that labor needs broad protection from the harmful effects
of acquisitions is partially incorrect or even entirely false.
a. Labor May not Need Protection from Takeovers
The proponents of protection for labor from the effects of com-
binational transactions include some renowned and high-level sup-
porters. Former Senator William Proxmire, for example, argued
that takeovers are quite detrimental to labor.' 8 ' Martin Lipton, a
level sincerely see these statutes as necessary to protect the long-accepted allocation of
claims against the corporation-not only those of managment and shareholders, but
those of employees and communities as well-from the disruptive effects of what is per-
ceived as market caprice."); Edward R. Aranow & Herbert A. Einhorn, State Securities
Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 768 (1971) (discussing state statutes
directed at tender offer regulation: "A number of states apparently feared that estab-
lished local concerns might, through the tender offer device, be taken over by outside
interests who would then close down plants and leave local residents jobless.");John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and
Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 460 (discussing how states have enacted constituency
statutes in the hope of "preventingjob flight and plant closings on the intuitive premise
that managements will continue to operate assets they cannot sell." (footnote omitted));
Mark A. Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?,
8 CORP. L. REV. 3, 31 (1985) (discussing how second-generation state takeover statutes
were intended to protect local employees, but arguing that "[w]hile this sentiment re-
flected a concern for protection of local jobs and not target management per se, such
parochialism remains exactly what the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.").
178 See Lymon Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes,
87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 852-53 (1989); David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Cor-
poration Law, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903, 927-28, 932-34 (1988).
179 See Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in
CORPORATE TAxEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 10 (AlanJ. Auerbach ed. 1988) (cit-
ing a 1987 survey by Louis Harris & Associates that found that 63% of the sampled
public felt that "employees" were the single group that needed protection during take-
overs). See also Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Contro" The Empirical Evi-
dence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 57 (1988) ("Recent takeovers in the airline
industry have involved conflict between acquiring-firm management and the (usually)
unionized labor of the target firm. These conflicts have contributed to the popular gen-
eralization that shareholder premiums from takeovers come largely at the expense of
labor.").
180 See infra note 315.
181 See William Proxmire, Introduction: What's Right and Wrong about Hostile Takeovers?,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 353, 360.
Takeovers have led directly to the elimination ofjobs. AFL-CIO officials
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well-known New York City corporate attorney, has maintained that
takeovers often threaten business operations which local employees
and communities have come to rely on for security.'8 2 Many news-
paper reports and commentaries have also reported detrimental ef-
fects of takeovers on employees and their communities, namely
layoffs and forced retirements.183
Labor, however, does not necessarily warrant protection, de-
spite the widespread public fears.' 8 4 The assumption underlying
these fears is that an out-of-state bidder usually intends to break up
the target, dispense with the local jobs, and thereby destroy the lo-
cal economy, community and culture. Bidders, however, would not
pay such a price to achieve such counterproductive results. Ac-
quirors are motivated by value; they seek the best bargain possible
to maximize the value of their acquisitions. Therefore, if the organi-
zation can generate wealth as it is, local interests should not be sub-
stantially harmed, and may actually be substantially enhanced by a
successful takeover. 8 5 If the organization can not generate wealth
where it is, bankruptcy, which is the real danger to labor, may be in
the offing. In fact, mergers may actually supply needed protection
from bankruptcy, and disallowing a merger under these circum-
stances may prove to be the very "protection" that labor does not
estimate that takeovers have caused the loss of 80,000 unionjobs. In the
aggregate some 500,000 jobs have been lost. Furthermore, American
workers are plundered even when they are not terminated. For example,
some $16 billion has been siphoned from private pension plans. In many
cases, the plundered funds went to firms attempting to fend off a bidder,
or even to successful bidders.
Id. (citing Hostile Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 262 (Mar. 4, 1987) (testimony of Thomas P. Donahue,
Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO)).
182 See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 25 (1987); see also Takeover Tactics and Public Policy: Hearings on H.R. 2371 et al.
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 81 (Nov. 28 and May 23, 1984) (statement
of Rep. Oxley discussing how Mobil Corporation's 1981 bid for Marathon Oil Company,
had it been successful, "would have spelled economic doom for the town of Findlay,
OH, population 38,000-2500 of them employees of Marathon Oil").
183 See, e.g., Robert O'Brien & Richard Kline, An RxforJobs Lost Through Mergers, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, § 4, at 23 (discussing how Owens-Coming was forced to cut its
pretakeover bid workforce of 28,000 by approximately 13,000 as part of its restructuring
to defeat a bid by Wickes Corporation in late 1986); see also People Trauma in Mergers, N.Y.
* TIMES, Nov. 19, 1985, at Dl, D5 (discussing how corporate acquirors have discharged or
pushed into early retirement tens of thousands of people); Thomas F. O'Boyle & Susan
Carey, Gulf's Departing Pittsburgh Would Deal a Harsh Blow to City's Economy and Pride, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 9, 1984, at 33; Norton Mintz, Community Dislocations: A Painful Side Effect of
Merger, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1980, at A2.
184 See Coffee, supra note 177, at 440 ("[A]ny claim that these stakeholders... de-
serve statutory protection may prove too much.... [It is not] clear that the extent of
their exposure is that great.").
185 See Hook, supra note 177, at 293.
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need. 86
Although takeovers may at times appear to harm labor, recent
factual evidence demonstrates that they do not systematically or
even in the majority of situations disadvantage labor.' 87 In many
situations, for example, postacquisition wage and employment
growth actually outpaces the growth that would otherwise have been
expected under the old management. 188 Even when employees are
laid off or relocated following an acquisition, no evidence supports a
conclusion that the subsequent relocations are any more drastic
than what would have been expected without an acquisition. 189 If a
business is in need of an economic restructuring, laybffs may be nec-
essary even if there is no acquisition. Furthermore, when employees
are laid off during or following an acquisition, management and
midlevel support staff usually bear the brunt of the cuts, not rank
and file workers. 190 For example, in the case of Wells Fargo's acqui-
sition of Crocker National Bank, 1600 managerial employees were
fired, including nearly all of the Crocker top executives, while the
non-managerial cutbacks were proportionately less. 191 Finally,
many seemingly "lost"jobs are really only relocated jobs that bene-
fit workers in other geographical areas or other economic sectors, so
186 See, e.g. Ronald E. Shrieves & Donald L. Stevens, Bankruptcy Avoidance as a Motive
for Merger, J. FIN. AND QuAN. ANAL. 501, 513 (1979) ("[M]any instances of severe finan-
cial crisis among large firms are resolved through merger [the] process. To the extent
that this process contributes to the efficiency with which resources are reallocated to
more productive ends, mergers serve a valuable function in our economy.").
187 SeeJarrell et al., supra note 179, at 57; see also Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Manage-
ment Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 239, 41 (1989) ("More
than three-fifths (61.5%) of [buyout] companies increase employment, with a median
increase of 4.9%.... The results here do not support the view that buyout gains come
from firing a large number of employees."); Brown & Medoff, supra note 179, at 9 (dis-
cussing how a recent National Bureau of Economic Research study shows that employ-
ment in acquired firms actually increases).
188 Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: The Restructuring of Corporate America,
53 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 426, 427 (1987). In other situations, slight reductions in
employment are often compensated by offsetting increases in labor rates and vice versa.
See Brown & Medoff, supra note 179, at 23.
189 See, e.g., Michael C.Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-
Dec. 1984, at 114.
190 See Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 467, 478-79 (1988) (discussing how the misconceptions regarding
widespread firings and wage cuts to rank-and-file workers following acquisitions are not
supported by factual evidence: "Generally only the administrative positions of relatively
high-level employees become redundant after a takeover."); see also Jensen, supra note
188, at 427 ("The data indicate that, within three years of an acquisition, roughly half of
the top level managers of acquired corporations are gone."); Susan R. Sanderson &
Lawrence Schein, Sizing Up the Down-Sizing Era, in ACROSS THE BOARD, Nov. 1986, at 17,
19-20 ("A direct consequence of mergers and acquisitions is the considerable loss of
jobs at the executive level," i.e., "nearly half" of the executives in large acquisition
targets left their positions).
191 See Sanderson & Schein, supra note 190, at 20.
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that the gains offset the losses to equalize the net global effect.1 92 In
short, no evidence supports the conclusion that takeover activity
systematically harms labor.
In fact, many acquisitions and takeovers actually benefit em-
ployees and local communities. New employers often have better
access to the capital markets and can finance improvements in the
organization to the benefit of all, including the employees. 193 Fur-
thermore, the acquisition itself may shock the organization into ac-
cepting new rules and procedures that improve productivity and
efficiency, leading to long-term increases in employment and
192 See Macey, supra note 190, at 478.
At worst, the workers in a particular state will be displaced by workers in
another state as the firm's assets are redeployed to that state. But when
this happens, overall national employment is unaffected. The only effects
are local. When state anti-takeover statutes prevent jobs from leaving
one state for another, they result in discrimination against out-of-state
workers in favor of local workers.
Id at 479. See also Davis, supra note 177, at 522 ("[A] loss ofjobs at the target's head-
quarters may be offset by new jobs at some other location. State takeover regulation
therefore entails the serious risk that legislators will focus upon the in-state losses and
ignore out-of-state gains."); Jensen, supra note 188, at 426 ("Divested plants and assets
do not disappear, they are reallocated.... [T]hey are moving to uses that their new
owners are betting are more productive. This is beneficial to society.... The change...
can cause some people to lose their jobs [but] others gain jobs."); Wirth Subcommittee
Hears Testimony on Community Impact of Tender Offers, 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 24,
at 1035 (June 14, 1985) (quoting Subcommittee Chairman, Representative Timothy E.
Wirth:
[It is] important to weigh the potentially negative impact of takeovers on
certain communities against the benefits to other communities. A take-
over which results in a plant closing or a change in location of the princi-
pal office in one community may result in the opening of a new plant or a
new headquarters in another community.).
193 Many acquirors are able to become acquirors because they maintain ready access
to the capital markets. Once a transaction is complete, acquirors retain sufficient capital
to channel new funds into organizational improvements to increase the return on their
investments. These improvements benefit the organization, the employees, and the
community, through better working conditions, increased efficiencies, and growing
profits that will support increased employment, compensation, and benefits. See Brown
& Medoff, supra note 179, at 10.
Unfortunately, some acquirors "kill" this opportunity to make improvements by
overleveraging their transaction. By financing their business combinations with too
much debt, many acquirors exhaust their access to outside capital and leave little capital
available to contribute to organizational improvements. Revco D.S. and Federated De-
partment Stores are good examples of this. Revco, for instance, quadrupled its debt to
$1.3 billion to finance its 1986 leveraged buyout. Stephen Phillips, Revco: Anatomy of an
LBO that Failed, Bus. WK., Oct. 3, 1988, at 62. Within two years, Revco's interest ex-
penses exceeded its available cash flow, and Revco filed for chapter 11 protection in
1988. Id. Similarly, Federated assumed extraordinary debt to finance its acquisition by
Campeau, and ended up in chapter 11. See infra note 222. Both companies took on a
debt load that generated debt payments far exceeding the available cash flow. Obvi-
ously, if debt repayment depletes all available cash, little is left for organizational
improvement.
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wages. 194 These factors undermine the argument that takeover ac-
tivity supposedly poses some harm to labor. Simply stated, public
perceptions that acquisitions always hurt labor are based on rela-
tively few, highly publicized situations' 9 5 and are not supported by
economic analyses or legitimate evidence.' 96
Some acquisitions obviously do hurt small fractions of the labor
force through layoffs and wage reductions; innovations that increase
long-term efficiency, profits, and standards of living sometimes re-
quire certain short-term hardships.' 9 7 Fortunately, the evidence
shows that harmful labor effects are uncommon. Therefore, labor
protection mechanisms must provide real protection from those
takeovers that are abusive and inefficient, but they should be struc-
tured to minimize interference in other situations. The federal doc-
trines provide this balance by preventing the rise of labor
dislocations and hardships when fraud is evident, and by mandating
bargaining in other situations.198 Legislative movement away from
the federal doctrines runs the risk of upsetting the delicate balance
of protection and efficiency.
b. These Enactments Provide No Real Protection
Certain forms of takeover abuse warrant labor protection, even
though these situations are uncommon. 199 The recent enactments,
however, do not provide broad enough coverage to furnish ade-
quate protection. Their limited focus on a discrete minority of the
workforce minimizes their effectiveness and ignores the vast major-
ity of the workforce that may suffer from abusive takeovers.
Any protection that these enactments offer flows only to union-
194 See infra note 240-66.
195 Brown & Medoff, supra note 179, at 9 (noting how, at the mention of "take-
overs," the public immediately thinks of "the elaborate history of Carl Icahn, Frank Lo-
renzo, and the airline industry.").
196 SeeJensen, supra note 188, at 427 (The media creates an impression that is con-
trary to the evidence when, for example, "[it] only report[s] on the 100 warehousemen
who were displaced in a conversion to a shopping center, and ignore[s] the thousands of
new workers employed in the newly opened center.").
197 See Jensen, supra note 189, at 114.
198 See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
199 Takeovers are motivated by both dubious and sensible rationales. Some of the
dubious rationales are to diversify operations, build management empires, increase
earnings per share by playing the "bootstap game," or lower financing costs. See
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 799-803. Takeovers motivated by these rationales
are economically and socially wasteful, and takeover legislation targeted at these specific
motivations would be valuable. On the other hand, many takeovers are motivated -by
sensible rationales. The sensible motivations for takeovers include capitalization on
economies of scale or vertical integration, combinations of complementary resources,
utilizing unused tax shields or surplus funds, and eliminating inefficiencies. See BREALEY
& MYERS, supra note 11, at 796-99; Jensen, supra note 188, at 426.
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ized laborers,200 who usually do not suffer the brunt of acquisition
cuts,2 0 l and who do not represent the majority of today's workforce.
Today, unionized employees comprise only a small fraction of the
total labor force, and an even smaller fraction of the private sector
labor force that would be subject to business combination transac-
tions.20 2 Thus, even if all fifty states enacted this type of legislation,
only a small percentage of the total nationwide workforce would be
"protected" from any harmful effects of business combination trans-
actions. Many acquisitions do not harm organized labor at all,20 3
and because many organized employees are employed by industries
subject to other takeover protections, 20 4 these statutes offer protec-
tion to only a very small segment of the labor force. With respect to
those employees who may need some protection, the recent state
legislation is underinclusive because it makes no effort to protect
unorganized labor or unrepresented employees. In fact, these stat-
utes may actually hurt more employees than abusive acquisitions
themselves.
c. These Statutes Hurt Both Organized and Unorganiied Labor
By deviating from the social and economic balancing allowed
under the federal doctrines, these recent enactments may lead to
detrimental and unintended results such as the mandated continua-
tion of labor contracts in circumstances that would be detrimental to
200 For details on protection available for employees under specific contracts, see
supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 190.
202 In 1989, only 16.4% of employee workers were union members, and only 12.3%
of private employee workers were union members. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 42 CURRENT WAGE DEVELOPMENTS 7, Table 2 (1990) [hereinafter
WAGE DEVELOPMENTS]. In the three states enacting the recent legislation the percent-
ages are not significantly higher; the percentages are actually lower in Delaware and
Massachusetts. In 1988, only 16.7% of Pennsylvania's privately employed workers were
union members. At the same time only 11.7% of Massachusetts' privately employed
workers and only 10.8% of Delaware's privately employed workers were union mem-
bers. See Michael A. Curme et al., Union Membership and Contract Coverage in the United
States, 1983-1988, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5, Table 5 (1990). Furthermore, national
private-sector union membership declined from 15% in 1983, id. at Table 1, to only
12.2% in 1989; WAGE DEVELOPMENTS, supra, at Table 2. Judging from this consistently
declining national trend, the state percentages quoted supra for 1988 are probably even
lower today.
203 See supra notes 181-98 and accompanying text.
204 Many industries are protected from transactional combinations due to either
their very nature or existing barriers to takeovers. For example, two of the five most
highly unionized industry segments are totally immune from takeover activity: the U.S.
Postal Service (81.3% unionized in 1988) and elementary & secondary schools (53.7%
unionized in 1988). See Curme et al., supra note 202, at Table 4. In fact, over 20% of all
unionized employees work in industry sectors that are free from any threats of takeovers
(schools and universities, libraries, social services, museums, religious orders, residen-
tial care facilities, etc.). Id.
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the very workers the legislatures were trying to protect. In some
situations, these statutes would merely shift whatever negative ef-
fects might arise onto the employees and constituencies specifically
left unprotected by the statutes. In other situations, they would ac-
tually cause even greater damage than they attempt to avoid by in-
creasing the probability of bankruptcy.-
Takeover activity often strikes at inefficient or financially inse-
cure industries. 205 Prior to any threats of a takeover, however, or-
ganized labor often has already agreed to drastic concessions in the
hope of keeping the company afloat and preserving the existing
jobs. In a takeover situation, the recent state enactments mandate
that the employees continue to be bound to their old agreements,
including the drastic concessions that they would not necessarily
have made to the new employer.20 6 Thus, the new employer, who
may be very profitable or financially sound, will gain a favorable la-
bor contract, and labor will be unable to force a change.20 7
The employees may lose their opportunity to force a change
even when they request contract renegotiations with the old man-
agement before the deal closes. In many situations, the potential
acquiror may agree to the transaction only if the "favorable" labor
contracts continue. In response, the previous management, in or-
der to save the deal, may stall or even refuse to renegotiate and
labor will be unable to change their contract. The deal will close
with labor unable to intervene on their own behalf.
Thus, labor has no power to change the "unfavorable" con-
tracts, with either the old management or the new management, and
these contracts will continue to be enforced even though this would
be detrimental to the employees. If the successorship doctrines
were applied instead of these recent state enactments, the terms of
the old contracts would not be automatically imposed and the or-
205 See Randall Morck et al., Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101 (AlanJ. Auerbach ed., 1988).
206 The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of such an inequity. See
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972) ("[H]olding... the union
... bound to the substantive terms of an old collective-bargaining contract may result in
serious inequities.... [A] union may have made concessions to a small or failing em-
ployer that it would be unwilling to make to a large or economically successful firm.").
207 It might be suggested that equity would demand that the employees be able to
unilaterally shed their agreement under these circumstances. This is not, however, how
the NLRA has been interpreted. See Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pen-
sion Fund v. Sloan, 714 F. Supp. 943, 947-48 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("Under section 8(d) of
the National Labor Management Relations Act, neither party to a collective bargaining
agreement may [unilaterally] modify [or sever] the agreement .. "), aff'd, 902 F.2d 593
(7th Cir. 1990); Staffman's Org. Comm. v. United Steelworkers of America, 399 F. Supp.
102, 105-06 (W.D. Mich. 1975) ("Congress, in enacting [the National Labor Relations
Act], indicated a broad concern with a procedure for making collective bargaining agree-
ments enforceable in the courts by either party.").
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ganized employees would be able to bargain with the new employer
for a new agreement to remedy their unfavorable situation.20 8 In
this way, the federal doctrines allow for a balancing of competing
equities in order to protect labor while the recent state enactments
do not.
Furthermore, unorganized employees would suffer from the
rigid effects of these enactments in the reverse situation, when or-
ganized employees have previously procured very favorable collec-
tive bargaining provisions. Under the mandates of the recent state
enactments, these provisions would continue, and the acquiring par-
ties would have to account for the economic effects of these provi-
sions in the pricing and structure of the acquisition. In order to
accommodate the favorable agreement given to organized employ-
ees, and to balance the total package of wage and salary costs, unor-
ganized employees, staff, and management would have to accept
corresponding and offsetting reductions in wages and benefits to
maintain the profitability of the transaction.
If the federal doctrines applied, however, the old employees
and the new employer would bargain over a new agreement, disre-
garding the previously negotiated and now "unfavorable" provi-
sions.209 This new agreement would probably reduce the burdens
of the previous collective bargaining agreement, and balance the
cost tradeoffs, to equally allocate the costs and benefits between or-
ganized and unorganized labor. Again, the federal doctrines bal-
ance competing equities while the recent state enactments do not;
and successorship could resolve a potentially detrimental situation
for unorganized labor, while the recent state enactments cannot.
Finally, in a situation where a corporation faces potential bank-
ruptcy, both organized and unorganized employees may suffer
under the mandates of the recent state enactments. If, for example,
a financially troubled company seeks to be acquired in order to
avoid financial ruin, potential acquirors may forgo the opportunity if
state legislation forces acquirors to assume burdensome collective
bargaining agreements. Thus, the financially troubled company will
be unable to locate a buyer.2 10 With no other alternatives, the com-
pany would be forced into bankruptcy and the resulting dissolution
208 See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
209 Id.
210 The Supreme Court recognized this reality and considered it a strong justifica-
tion for constructing the balancing approach of the successorship doctrine:
[H]olding... the new employer bound to the substantive terms of an old
collective-bargaining contract may result in serious inequities. A poten-
tial employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he
can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force,
work location, task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such
an employer with the terms and conditions of employment contained in
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would be detrimental to everyone, especially labor.211 Under the
federal doctrines, however, the parties could renegotiate their
agreement, save the company, and thereby preserve the jobs and
the stability of the communities relying on thosejobs.212 This again
demonstrates that the federal doctrines can balance equities where
the recent state enactments do not, and can resolve a detrimental
situation where the recent state enactments cannot. If the recent
enactments are allowed to override the federal doctrines, both or-
ganized and unorganized employees will suffer.
In summary, the recent enactments fail to protect employees
and their respective communities. Even though some employees
might benefit under the provision of these statutes, the majority of
employees, and communities as a whole, would suffer. The only
real protection provided by the statutes would flow to the actual la-
bor contracts themselves. The contracts would survive even though
any benefits at all would be slight and even though the contracting
parties themselves would suffer.213 Thus, collective bargaining
agreements would become more important than the actual constitu-
encies that the agreements were supposed to protect. The NLRA
never contemplated such an extraordinarily dominant position for
collective bargaining agreements, and to accord these agreements
such lofty status undercuts the very purposes of that Act.2 14 Un-
doubtedly, the Delaware, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania legisla-
tures could not have intended their legislation to result in such
incongruities.
2. Takeover Prevention
Labor protection may not have been the only motivation for
these enactments. These statutes also appear to be aimed at
preventing or minimizing takeovers because all three states enacted
their labor contracts statutes in the process of enacting broad an-
titakeover packages. 21 5 Indeed, in Pennsylvania, the antitakeover
the old collective-bargaining contract may make these changes impossi-
ble and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital.
Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-88.
211 See infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
213 Union management, however, is protected: they still have their constituency and
corresponding union dues. Therefore, protection of union management and the union
organization itself may actually be the ultimate motivation. In Pennsylvania, for exam-
ple, "[t]he insertion of [the] provisions [that mandated continuation of the labor con-
tracts] was a major factor in securing the support of organized labor for the act's
adoption." Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 175, at 8.
214 See infra notes 276-325 and accompanying text.
215 See 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 (Purdon); see also Hearings on Pennsylvania Senate Bill
No. 1310, supra note 175, at 1-311 (various witnesses testifying how the bill would re-
strict takeover activity in Pennsylvania); accord Daily Report for ExecutivesJuly 19, 1989
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package that included the labor contracts statute has moved that
state into the spotlight as one of the strictest antitakeover states in
the country. 216 One pair of commentators has stated that the result-
ing layers of legislation "may significantly hinder, if not completely
halt, hostile takeover activity within Pennsylvania. ' 21 7
Obviously, some takeover legislation is necessary to limit abu-
sive takeovers that serve no beneficial purpose. 218 This section ar-
gues, however, that the recent state enactments unwittingly obstruct
the policing effects that other antitakeover legislation directs at abu-
sive takeovers.219 Indeed, these collective bargaining provisions to-
tally disregard the valuable social and economic benefits provided
by takeovers in general,220 and overbroadly restrict the beneficial
effects of perfectly legitimate takeovers. 221 In sum, this section ar-
gues that the legislatures should not have enacted these statutes if
they were truly concerned with preventing or even minimizing the
real problems associated with some recent takeovers. 222
("Gov. Michael S. Dukakis (D) signed into law July 18 legislation that would restrict the
ability of corporations or individuals to engage in 'hostile' takeovers of firms incorpo-
rated in Massachusetts.... [Any] corporation formed as a result of [a] takeover would
... be required to assume existing collective bargaining agreements.").
216 Wallman & Gordon, supra note 176, at 38 (citing Raider, Raider, Go Away, TiME,
May 14, 1990, at 75).
217 Id. Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 175, at 5.
218 Takeovers are motivated by both dubious and sensible rationales. See supra note
199. Those takeovers motivated by dubious rationales are often harmful to industry, the
economy, and stakeholders alike. On the other hand, sensible takeovers fulfill important
business and social functions, and should not be appraised with the same speculation
that should be directed at truly wasteful takeovers. See infra notes 240-66 and accompa-
nying text.
219 See infra notes 223-39 and accompanying text.
220 See infra notes 240-66 and accompanying text.
221 See infra notes 267-77 and accompanying text.
222 Instead of restricting takeovers and buyouts in general, perhaps legislatures
should focus on the specific attributes of abusive acquisitions which cause the very
problems they are currently attempting to address. Many takeovers and buyouts actually
generate value and may provide the perfect opportunity for improving the organization.
See infra notes 240-66 and accompanying text. If a transaction is overleveraged, how-
ever, the survivor may be forced to make operational cutbacks, asset divestitures, and
even employee layoffs, in order to generate sufficient capital to cover its debt repayment
obligations. Truly excessive leveraging may even lead to bankruptcy. The Federated
Department Stores acquisition demonstrates this point.
In April of 1988, Campeau Corporation executed a highly leveraged "strategic ac-
quisition" of Federated Department Stores. Steven N. Kaplan, Campeau's Acquisition of
Federated: Value Destroyed or Value Added, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 191, 195-97 (1989). Campeau
paid Federated's shareholders a 124% premium for their shares, resulting in total acqui-
sition costs that exceeded $8 billion, including fees and expenses. Id. at 195-96.
Campeau financed more than 97% of its costs with debt. Id. at 196. In order to cope
with this heavy debt load, Campeau sold many of Federated's assets, including nine of
Federated's fifteen previous operating divisions. Id at 198.
Campeau's overall scheme actually generated economic value because once the
divestitures and spin-offs were complete, the combined value of the separate "pieces"
exceeded the value of Federated as a whole under pre-Campeau management. Id. at
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a. The Labor Contract Statutes Interfere with other Takeover
Statutes
The recent labor contract enactments would force corporations
to favor organized employees over all other constituencies. Em-
ployees may need some protection, but the federal doctrines already
protect labor in an equitable balance of corporate efficiency and em-
ployee expectations. 223 Furthermore, many states have enacted
constituency statutes that allow directors to fend off abusive take-
over attempts, but the recent collective bargaining statutes conflict
with the very nature of these constituency statutes.224
Constituency statutes allow corporate directors to consider
nonshareholder "stakeholder" interests as well as shareholder inter-
ests when analyzing the corporation's overall "best interests." 225 In
attempting to shift state corporate law away from a narrow focus on
210-11. Unfortunately, however, the surviving, heavily debt-laden Federated ended up
cash-poor and could not cover its debt repayment obligations. l at 191. On January
15, 1990, Federated filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. l
The Federated scenario is one example of why legislatures should focus on excess
leverage, not takeovers in general; to reduce the abusive and wasteful results of many
recently failed acquisitions. Campeau's takeover generated value and, therefore, was an
economically beneficial acquisition. The problem, however, was the excess leverage. If
Campeau had financed its acquisition with more equity and less debt, i.e., less leverage,
Federated would not have ended up in chapter 11 and the acquisition would have suc-
cessfully generated economic value. Id. at 211.
223 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
224 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 511, 1721 (1990).
225 Constituency statutes have been enacted to allow management and corporate
directors to refuse takeover bids, even in the face of extremely lucrative offers that
would yield extraordinary financial gains to the shareholders. Without such statutes,
refusal to accept a premium bid would expose the directors to personal liability for
breach of their fiduciary duties to the shareholders. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Gov-
ernance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMoRY LJ. 1155, 1163 (1990) (Constitu-
ency statutes are "primarily intended to help management oppose hostile takeovers by
making it difficult for shareholder-plaintiffs to sue directors successfully for the loss of a
premium from a defeated bid.... [These statutes function like... limited liability
statutes."); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney's Duty to the Corpora-
tion a Paradigm for Directors?, 39 HASTNGS L.J. 677, 695 (1988) ("mhese statutes are a
product of political dissatisfaction with the traditional judicial principle that directors
faced with a takeover owe their primary allegiance to shareholders. Rather, these stat-
utes posit a duty to other constituencies and a concern for the survival of the corporate
entity.").
Delaware has not enacted a constituency statute, which makes the adoption of its
collective bargaining statute particularly confusing. If the legislature intended to pro-
tect employees, it failed. See supra notes 181-219 and accompanying text. If the legisla-
ture intended to restrict takeovers, it would have been better off adopting a constituency
statute, which would allow directors, in the exercise of their fiduciary duties as policed
by the courts, to repel abusive takeovers but continue to transact legitimate combina-
tional transactions in the best interests of the shareholders and other constituencies.
This anomoly leaves this author wondering just who the Delaware legislature considers
to be an important corporate constituency: shareholders? directors? or the very small
sector of organized labor interests disparately served by these collective bargaining
statutes?
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shareholder interests, which might externalize the interests of other
stakeholders, the constituency statutes allow corporate boards to
consider all of the corporate constituencies when making corporate
decisions. 226 These statutes, which some commentators have de-
scribed as a return to "broader social concerns," 227 attempt to mini-
mize the net social losses resulting from abusive acquisitions. 228
The constituency statutes aim broadly at protecting "stakeholders,"
including employees and the communities in which they live and
work.229
The recent labor contract enactments, however, actually contra-
dict the purposes and conflict with the intended benefits of the con-
stituency statutes. In Pennsylvania, a major section of the 1990 Act
established that directors "may, in considering the best interests of the
corporation, consider to the extent they deem appropriate the ef-
fects of any corporate action upon any or all groups affected by such
actions including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers,
... creditors ... and... communities ... [as well as] ... [a]ll other
pertinent factors. '230 On its face, such a provision seems to allow a
board of directors, in full compliance with their fiduciary duties as
policed by the courts, to consider all constituencies and all effects, in
some form of a "corporate and social equation," before deciding
whether and how to proceed with a business combination transac-
tion. Obviously, such a net social equation of this type should in-
clude all relevant factors including 23 1  collective bargaining
agreements and their effects on corporate financial operations and
combinational transactions. Under the mandates of the recent en-
actments, however, directors cannot terminate or even modify these
agreements during or after a business combination transaction.
23 2
Thus, the supposedly broad consideration of all "pertinent factors"
can never include the very pertinent provisions and effects of labor
agreements. Net corporate and social gain or loss will always be
226 See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text for an explanation and discussion
of externalities and how they are internalized.
227 SeeJohnson & Millon, supra note 178, at 848, 855; Millon, supra note 178, at 905-
11,925-26.
228 Proof of a net social loss, however, is particularly indeterminate because stake-
holder opportunity losses seldom equal the face value of their apparent losses. See Cof-
fee, supra note 177, at 448.
229 See Alexander C. Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities
under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1451, 1452-54 (1990).
230 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 515(b), 1715(c) (1991) (emphasis added); see also
Wallman & Gordon, supra note 176, at 38 (discussing the effects of the changes).
231 See AlanJ. Auerbach, Introduction, to CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES 1 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) ("[Ilt is ... extremely important that 'all' the
costs and benefits of mergers be evaluated if their overall value is to be understood.").
232 See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
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miscalculated when the analysis is forced to leave out such impor-
tant factors. 233
Furthermore, continuation of collective bargaining agreements
after the transaction may not serve "the best interests of the corpo-
ration" or even the best interests of the employees. In fact, continu-
ation of these agreements may harm everyone. For example, a
corporation may have negotiated and executed collective bargaining
agreements when economic prosperity allowed the corporation to
agree to relatively costly labor provisions. If economic conditions
have changed to a point where the old agreements have become ec-
onomically burdensome, the corporation may not be able to survive
under the strictures of the old provisions. 254 The "best interests of
the corporation," in such situations, may be liquidation or sale. If
the corporation's assets could be sold to other organizations, new
labor agreements could be negotiated with the employees that even-
tuallyjoin those other organizations and valuable production assets
could remain in production with the employees retaining their
jobs.235
The recent enactments, however, foreclose this result. Indeed,
"no merger, consolidation, sale of assets or business combination,
[including one transaction or a series of transactions], shall result in
the termination or impairment of the provisions of any labor con-
tract. '23 6 Thus, even if the assets were sold piecemeal to numerous
organizations, the provisions of the labor contracts would appar-
ently follow along to each of those new organizations. Under this
type of a requirement, many corporations in Delaware, Massachu-
setts, and Pennsylvania that face financial hardship would be unable
to transfer their assets to a higher-valued user or group of users23 7
233 See Auerbach, supra note 231, at 1.
234 This was part of what allowed Carl Icahn to take over TWA. The management of
TWA either would not, or could not, reduce the obligations arising under labor con-
tracts with its highly paid employees. If it were not for Icahn stepping in to force these
reductions, the company might have lost its competitiveness in the newly deregulated
airline market. See Dale A. Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills,
and Who Gets Iced, 13 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 879, 892 n.60 (1988). Obviously, other
problems subsequently developed at TWA, but nothing supports the conclusion that
reducing waste at TWA contributed to these problems.
235 SeeJensen, supra note 188, at 427 (discussing how when the processes for change
are "too slow, costly, and clumsy" the market for corporate control brings about
changes in strategy and in the organization itself to increase efficiency).
236 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 706(a) (1990) (emphasis added); accord MAss. GEN. L.
ch. 149 § 20E (1989); 15 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 2586, 2587 (1991). Technically, the
statutes do allow the parties to discontinue the contract upon mutual consent. Practi-
cally, however, few contracts will be discontinued when their provisions are favorable to
either one side or the other and when the party holding the benefits refuses to give its
consent out of fear that it might lose those benefits upon subsequent renegotiation.
237 See Jensen, supra note 188, at 427 ("If assets are to move to their most highly
valued use, [business] must be able to sell off assets to those who can use them more
1991]
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because the new owners would have the same problem as the old
owner: inefficient and unprofitable assets. Thus, the corporation
will be unable to find an acquiror, or even a group of acquirors, for
their proverbial "sinking ship" and the corporation may be forced
into bankruptcy much to the detriment of the corporation, its share-
holders, creditors, customers, employees and local communities,
not to mention our economy and society as a whole.
In order to avoid these problems, most legislatures have at-
tempted to ensure that their constituency statutes would not require
one set of stakeholder interests to totally displace the interests of
other stakeholders or shareholders. 238 The recent collective bar-
gaining enactments, however, disallow terminations or even modifi-
cations of labor contracts during the course of a business
combination and result in exactly what the legislatures were trying
to avoid. Actions in the "best interests of the company" become
heavily weighted in favor of union contracts and union management
and heavily weighted against shareholders and other constituencies.
Instead of eliminating the narrow focus on shareholders, which is
what the corporate constituency statutes attempt,23 9 the recent col-
lective-bargaining provisions force a narrow focus, not on labor, or
even on organized labor, but on organized labor contracts. In fact,
the statutes do not mandate that labor agreements continue when
continuation would serve the best interests of the employees, the
corporation, or even society in general. Instead, the statutes require
unconditional continuation of labor agreements whether they are
good or bad, for labor or for anybody.
b. Takeovers Perform a Valuable Function in our Economy
Those takeovers that are truly wasteful and harmful obviously
warrant legislative controls.2 40 Many takeovers, however, provide
valuable economic benefits. In fact, takeovers are a major compo-
nent of the managerial labor market where alternative management
productively."). In practice, many transactions would not have occurred for precisely
this reason. Carl Icahn, for example, may have opted not to take over TWA, which
would have resulted in a great loss to TWA's shareholders. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note
234, at 892 n.60 (discussing the concessions that Icahn received from the unions al-
'lowing him to shed inefficient and burdensome labor agreements and pass the savings
on to TWA shareholders in the acquisition).
238 Pennsylvania's statute, for example, specifically states that directors are not re-
quired to consider any one constituency, including shareholders, as dominating a deci-
sion or displacing the interests of other constituencies in every instance. See 1990 Pa.
Legis. Serv. 36 (Purdon); see also Wallman & Gordon, supra note 176, at 38 (discussing
Pennsylvania's constituency provisions).
239 See Wallman & Gordon, supra note 176, at 38.
240 See supra note 199.
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teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.
241
The efficient win, the inefficient lose.242 The benefits that flow from
this battle include efficiency gains, through organizational improve-
ment, and shareholder protection.243 These benefits bolster corpo-
rate and national competitiveness and should not be casually
discarded in a vain attempt to satisfy the demands of a relatively
small interest group.244
Takeovers increase efficiency by policing and dislodging harm-
ful corporate practices, obligations, and structures. 245 If, for exam-
ple, an organization is party to labor contracts that stem from a
protectionist age of regulation buthave become burdensome in the
age of some deregulation, a perceptive acquiror should be able to
acquire control of that organization, rid it of its inefficiencies, and
channel the recovered wealth into either shareholder dividends or
productive investments. 246 This type of restructuring benefits both
the particular industry involved and the overall economy.2 47 The
241 Jensen, supra note 188, at 427.
242 See Hal R. Varian, Symposium on Takeovers, 2 J. ECON. PEPsp. 3, 3 (1988) ("If
the current managers fail to maximize value, a takeover offers a mechanism whereby
shareholders can replace the current managers with managers who offer better
performance.").
243 SeeJensen, supra note 188, at 426; Varian, supra note 242, at 3-4 ("To the extent
that acquisitions encourage efficient operations by management, they can be an effective
mechanism for enhancing economic performance."); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process, 2 J. ECON. PEtsp. 7, 11 (1988)
("Makeovers are probably the most effective way for shareholders to get rid of non-
value-maximizing managers without bribing them.").
244 See Jensen, supra note 188, at 429; Varian, supra note 242, at 5 ("To the extent
that more trade is better, social policies that restrict voluntary exchanges of assets are
bad policies. This maxim applies just as well to financial markets as to other sorts of
markets.").
245 See Macey, supra note 190, at 469 ("Takeovers generally maximize shareholder
welfare by weeding out inefficient incumbent management and permitting new manage-
ment teams to increase the value of the firm by redeploying the firm's assets to more
profitable uses."); see also Jensen, supra note 188, at 426-29 (discussing how takeovers
motivate the "efficient utilization of resources").
246 See Oesterle, supra note 234, at 892 n.60 (discussing how Carl Icahn achieved this
with TWA); see also Harris Colingwood, Icahn's Incredible Shrinking Airplane, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 19, 1990, at 42 (discussing how Icahn continued to seek union concessions to avoid
having to "continue to shrink" the company). Other well-known "raiders" have insti-
gated similar economic recapture in other industries, such as T. Boone Pickens in the oil
industry. SeeJensen, supra note 188, at 428-29.
247 SeeJensen, supra note 188, at 429 ("The pressures created.., in the corporate
control market are having very healthy effects on Corporate America .... The result is a
more productive and competitive economy."); see also Michael C.Jensen, A Helping Hand
for Entrenched Managers, WALL ST.J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 36 ("The restructuring of corporate
America... by the takeover market is streamlining many of [our] corporations that are
simply too large, too complicated and too unfocused to be efficient. Restructuring is
bringing top-level managers closer to employees, customers and shareholders. We must
not strangle these productive forces."); cf. Macey, supra note 190, at 472 ("Mender
offers are launched because the acquirer can realize gains by reorganizing the firm, re-
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theory may be summarized as follows:
[1If the management of firm A is more efficient than the manage-
ment of firm B, and if after firmA acquires firm B, the efficiency of
firm B is brought up to the level of efficiency of firm A, efficiency is
increased by merger. Note that this would be a social gain as well
as a private gain. The level of efficiency in the economy would be
raised by such mergers. 248
According to this theory, takeovers, and even the mere threat of
takeovers, increase efficiency by forcing organizations to liquidate
excess assets, to disburse the resulting surplus and free cash flow to
the shareholders, and to initiate synergistic combinations of existing
resources. 249 The resulting efficiencies produce higher stock prices,
enhanced capital flows, and increased investment;250 all of which
benefit our economy.
Takeovers also help to protect shareholders from management
entrenchment. 25 1 Takeovers and the threat of takeovers serve to
placing existing management, or combining the target firm's assets with the assets of the
bidding firm so as to create value.").
248 COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 2, at 683; see also Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers:
Their Causes and Consequences, 2J. EcoN. PERsp. 21 (1988) (discussing how takeovers can
improve efficiency). Former Senator William Proxmire has concisely and eloquently
stated the theory, though at the time he did not fully endorse it:
[M]ergers are the product of a truly free market at work: if aggressive
investors determine that a publicly held corporation is poorly managed,
and if those investors believe they can buy control of the firm, discharge
the inefficient management and manage the firm more profitably, they
should do exactly that. According to this model, the result is a more effi-
cient allocation of resources that benefits stockholders, and benefits the
American economy as well, by assuring that the nation's resources are
more efficiently used.
Proxmire, supra note 181, at 353.
249 See Jensen, supra note 188, at 427-29.
250 Some argue, however, that effects in the financial markets are not indicative of
the true benefits or detriments to society. See Proxmire, supra note 181, at 354 ("In the
real world, management of a successful corporation must be concerned with the firm's
long-run growth and survival, not merely with the short-term stock price."). However,
the distinction between maximizing firm value for the present versus maximizing firm
value for the future is a false one. Share valuation is determined by the present value of
both present and future earnings. Future earnings from current investments are re-
flected immediately in a firm's current share price as long as the relevant information is
communicated to the markets. Arguments that hostile takeovers force management to
focus on the short-term ignore this reality. Efforts to increase share value must neces-
sarily take into account the long-term, since those earnings are critical to share valua-
tion. See Macey, supra note 190, at 481; see also Jensen, supra note 248, at 26 ("There is
much evidence inconsistent with the myopic markets view and no evidence that indicates
it is true.").
251 See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 243, at 1 1; Jensen, supra note 188, at 427. Cor-
porate management has been accused of trying to protect its entrenchment motivations
by pressing for antitakeover legislation. See William Armstrong, In Defense of Takeovers,
INSTITUTIONAL INv., April 1988, at 29 ("Just as kings built walls and moats to keep out
their serfs, a number of executives from top companies have asked [legislatures] to build
them a legal fortress that would stop takeovers.").
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ensure that corporate managers pursue goals and investments that
truly serve the best interests of the firm.252 When internal contr6l
mechanisms function properly, the corporate board of directors
should ensure that management acts in the shareholders' best inter-
ests. If new managerial talent would do a better job in running the
firm, the board should replace the old management in order to max-
imize the resulting value of the firm.253 When these internal control
mechanisms break down, however, this may not happen, and the
takeover market steps in to enforce shareholder and stakeholder in-
terests by allowing alternative management to compete for the right
to better run the company.2 4 Takeovers, therefore, and the mere
threat of takeovers, force necessary rearrangements when the ex-
isting managerial policies result in inefficiency, irresponsibility, or
actions not in the best interests of the shareholders and stakehold-
ers.255 T. Boone Pickens, for example, forced a very beneficial
shakeup of the oil industry by threatening and executing takeovers
of inefficient oil companies that were wasting huge amounts of capi-
tal on wasteful drilling programs and production overcapacities.256
The Phillips restructuring, for example, resulted in a $1.2 billion
increase in market value, while Arco's voluntary restructuring re-
sulted in a $3.2 billion gain in market value.257 Thus, Pickens's take-
over threats forced necessary rearrangments that significantly
benefitted shareholder and stakeholder interests.
Takeovers also allow shareholders to assert their rightful con-
trol over the corporation. Corporate control ultimately lies with the
corporation's shareholders because they bear the residual risk.258
The power to buy and sell shares of corporate ownership is a basic
shareholder right,259 and corporate law should allow shareholders
to reap the benefits and bear the burdens of their investments. 260
252 See BREALEY &MYERS, supra note 11, at 798-99;Jensen, supra note 188, at 427-29;
Hearings on Pennsylvania Senate Bill No. 1310, supra note 175, at 208 (testimony of Profes-
sor Randell Woolridge).
253 See Jensen, supra note 189, at 119.
254 Id.
255 Id
256 See Jensen, supra note 188, at 428.
257 Id
258 See HARRY G. HENN &JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 189, at 439-501 (3rd ed. 1983); Jensen, supra note 189, at 111.
259 See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 258, at 451.
260 Corporations are generally structured to allow those individuals with the most
invested ultimately to control the business decisions. Since majority owners have signifi-
cant investments at stake, with only residual claimant rights, their risk of loss has to be
balanced by a right to reap the financial benefits of good business decisions. The corpo-
ration is, effectively, the property of the shareholders, and these shareholders need to
retain the right to change ineffective management to protect their property interests. See
Theodore W. Grippo, In Defense of State Takeover Laws, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 273, 275
(1988); HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 258, at 439-501.
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Shareholders of a selling corporation typically realize a forty to fifty
percent premium over the preacquisition trading price of their
stock.26 1 The recent labor contracts provisions, however, restrict
shareholders' ability to market their ownership in order to take ad-
vantage of such premiums. As labor contracts are granted the pro-
tection of the recent state enactments, acquirors will do one of two
things. They will either totally forsake acquisitions or substantially
reduce acquisition premiums to account for the additional cost of
assuming the seller's collective bargaining agreements. This addi-
tional cost to the acquiror will necessarily reduce the acquisition
premiums, at least partially, and shareholders will lose a portion of
their expected return on their investment.262 The recent labor con-
tract enactments, therefore, hurt shareholders by shifting corporate
rights from a broad class of shareholders to a narrow class of em-
ployees, even though such a shift does not necessarily benefit the
employees. 263
261 Jensen, supra note 188, at 426 (the approximate average is a 50% premium, with
some acquisitions generating premiums exceeding 100%). The shareholders of RJR
Nabisco, for example, ended up receiving roughly $109 for shares that were trading
near $55 immediately preceeding the buyout bidding; this increase yielded a 98% pre-
mium. See Curtis Vosti, RJR's $5.1 Billion Payoff, PENSIONS & INV. AGE, Dec. 12, 1988, at
1. Similarly, due to AT&T's acquisition interests, and, finally, to its hostile tender offer,
NCR's shareholders saw the prices of their shares rocket from $48 at the close of trading
on Nov. 7, 1990, to $81.50 at the close of trading on Dec. 3, 1990. See WALL ST.J., Dec.
3, 1990, at A3; WALL ST.J., Dec. 4, 1990, at A3. As of Apr. 22, 1990, NCR shares had
risen to $102, as traders bet that AT&T would succeed at $110. See WALL ST.J., Apr. 12,
1991, at A4. Even at $102, NCR shareholders would realize a 112% premium over the
price they would have received immediately prior to the disclosure of AT&T's interest
on November 8, 1990.
262 In Pennsylvania, for example, enactment of the 1990 antitakeover package cost
shareholders in Pennsylvania firms roughly four billion dollars. The Investors' Backlash,
25 MERGERS & AcqutsrrsoNs 20 (1991). It may be argued, of course, that many securi-
ties laws, state corporate codes, and other forms of legislation yield similar results. See
HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 258, at 451-54. However, the mere fact that some share-
holder rights are already eroded does not by itself justify further erosion. Cf Arm-
strong, supra note 251, at 29. Shareholders that sell their shares to a bidder are,
simply exercising their legitimate right to buy and sell corporate
stock.... Enacting [certain types of] antitakeover legislation would be
like telling someone who is selling a house that it is against the law to
accept the highest offer. [Such] laws would restrict the sale of publicly
held stock and balkanize America's heralded national markets and inter-
state commerce.
Id.
263 See Macey, supra note 190, at 471 (arguing that antitakeover statutes provide job
protection for inefficient management and force jobs to remain in certain regions at the
expense of other regions: "Such protectionism is costly not only to the shareholders of
these firms, but also to consumers and workers."); but cf Coffee, supra note 177, at 465
(agreeing that takeovers can "prune inefficient corporate empires" and thereby benefit
shareholders, but arguing that "the new characteristic pattern of bidder losses also sug-
gests that wealth transfers are endemic and interfere with the simple story of assets mov-
ing to their highest and best use."). According to Coffee, "the appropriate response
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In summary, takeovers and the threat of takeovers promote effi-
ciencies, generate necessary organizational changes, and protect
and reward shareholder and stakeholder investments.264 Legisla-
tion that overly restricts takeover activity erodes these benefits. The
NLRB and the federal courts have developed the federal doctrines
with respect to labor obligations in accordance with the premise that
corporate owners require freedom to "rearrange their busi-
nesses," 265 via takeovers. In providing for an equitable balance, 266
these federal doctrines allow businesses to conduct economically
necessary takeover activity while the resulting effects on otherwise
external labor interests are equitably policed by the NLRB and the
courts. The recent state enactments totally disregard this balancing
approach and place at risk the substantial benefits of an adaptable
and equitable analysis.
c. The Recent Enactments Are Unnecessarily Overbroad
One of the usual motivations for antitakeover legislation is
stopping the perceived threats of abusive acquisitions. 267 In Penn-
sylvania, for example, recent antitakeover legislation was motivated
by the legislature's desire to avoid "such perceived harmful effects
of [abusive] corporate takeovers as job losses and plant dosings." 268
should be not to bar takeovers, but to spread the premium so as to compensate the
'losers.'" Id.
264 See Jensen, supra note 188, at 427.
265 See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
266 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
267 See, e.g., Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 175, at 5 (discussing Pennsylvania's re-
cent antitakeover package and its motivations).
Takeovers sometimes start with unexpected and unsolicited bids for control of the
target. Acquisitions commencing with bids that were neither previously negotiated nor
concurrently accepted by the target board are classified as "hostile" acquisitions. See
Morck et al., supra note 205, at 102. Logically enough, acquisitions that are not classified
as hostile are called "friendly." This section of the Note does not use the "hostile" or
"friendly" terminology because those terms do not reflect the true economic and social
value of various types of acquisitions. See supra notes 199, 218 and accompanying text.
This Note, instead, refers to "abusive" or "beneficial" transactions that may include
either hostile or friendly acquisitions, or both, depending on their economic and social
value.
Quite often when legislatures attempt to specifically target antitakeover legislation,
they enact statutes that focus on hostile takeovers rather than abusive takeovers. See
infra note 268. Since there is not a direct correlation between "hostile" and "abusive"
takeovers, this Note often uses "abusive" versus "beneficial" to avoid misconceptions.
268 Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 175, at5.
The Pennsylvania antitakeover package of 1990 is a good example of legislators
focusing on hostile takeovers instead of abusive takeovers. Many witnesses testifying at
the Pennsylvania hearings on the Act spoke of the need to restrict hostile takeovers
while leaving friendly takeovers unaffected. Steve Wallman, counsel to the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives and closely involved in drafting the bill, stated that "friendly
transaction[s] .... [are] not covered by the bill. The bill is aimed specifically at raider
type activities and the effects of raiders on corporations after [the] raid has occurred. So
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Beneficial acquisitions, however, do not promote the same fears be-
cause they are usually synergistic restructurings 269 that are less
likely than abusive takeovers to lead to plant closings or break-
ups. 270 These types of acquisitions are beneficial to both manage-
ment and stakeholders, and should not be subject to the same harsh
antitakeover legislation to which the abusive takeovers should be
subject.
Mandating the continuance of collective bargaining agree-
ments, however, will discourage beneficial acquisitions. 271 For ex-
[as to] the friendly type of transaction, there would be no effect." Hearings on Senate Bill
No. 1310, supra note 175, at 32. State Representative Snyder stated that "the primary
intent of this proposal is to put a crimp in the activities of those corporate raiders whose
ultimate goal is a fast buck as opposed to acquiring a going concern in order to run it
better." Id at 36. Bill Althaus, Mayor of the City of York, stated that "[i]f one is looking
at legitimate corporate acquisitions . . . [there is nothing] in this legislation that is an
impediment." Id at 10. The supporters and drafters of this legislation wanted it to
protect Pennsylvania from the typical, detrimental effects of abusive takeovers. Simulta-
neously, however, they wanted "legitimate" acquisitions to continue. Unfortunately, the
legislators based the statutes on a distinction between hostile and friendly takeovers,
instead of on a distinction between abusive and beneficial takeovers. See supra notes 218,
240-66 and accompanying text. Hostile takeovers were targeted as the "threat" to
Pennsylvania interests even though that category overbroadly includes beneficial hostile
acquisitions that do not yield the detrimental effects about which the legislators were
concerned.
The legislation targeted hostile transactions by hinging many of its effects on a
"control-share approval." See 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36, at 117 (Purdon) (enacting
§ 2585 to state that the collective-bargain provisions would apply only to transactions
"owned by a registered corporation... at the time of a control-share approval."). This
control-share approval mechanism effectively limits the restrictions of the statute to
"hostile" transactions not agreed to by the target board. Once a shareholder obtains a
controlling percentage of ownership in the target corporation, without approval, the
shareholder loses the voting rights for these shares. The shareholder can only regain
these voting rights by an affirmative majority vote. Thus, a "hostile" acquiror cannot
gain voting control over the corporation without a "control-share approval" of the rest
of the shareholders. See id at 101-06 (enacting §§ 2561, 2561-2563).
Tying this control-share approval to the labor contracts provision, however, appar-
ently confused some of the Act's staunchest supporters. This confusion was clearly evi-
denced during the hearings in the testimony of George Becker, Vice President of United
Steelworkers of America: "Protection of labor union contracts.., would apply to both
successful raids and friendly takeovers." See Hearings on Senate Bill No. 1310, supra note
175, at 17.
According to the testimony of Mr. Wallman, and to the actual wording of the stat-
ute, Mr. Becker was wrong; the mandates of the statute only apply to hostile transac-
tions. Therefore, even if a hostile transaction is structured so that renegotiating the
labor agreement would actually be better for labor, or even if a friendly transaction is
structured to avoid the labor agreements, the statutes provide no relief. See supra notes
205-14 and accompanying text. In this light, they are both overbroad and underinclu-
sive. One wonders if the unions would have supported the bill as written if they had
known that the statute was directed only at hostile transactions and would provide no
benefit to labor, and actually hurt labor, in many takeover situations.
269 "Synergistic" reflects "the possibility of benefits from combining the business of
two firms". Morck et al., supra note 205, at 101.
270 Id. at 104.
271 See Fortress Pennsylvania, supra note 18 (The recent Pennsylvania collective-
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ample, forced continuation of collective bargaining agreements may
cause a potential acquiror, "friendly" or not, to look elsewhere for
acquisition candidates. Similarly, if a union does not want to con-
tinue agreements that contain unfavorable concessions made to the
old employer, the potential acquiror, or even the potential seller,
might shy away from a beneficial transaction for fear of future labor
unrest or dissatisfaction. Under the successorship doctrine, ac-
quirors could avoid or renegotiate burdensome collective bargain-
ing obligations, 272 but under the mandates of the recent
enactments, they cannot. Therefore, forced continuation of unat-
tractive bargaining agreements may deter even beneficial
transactions.
In Pennsylvania, for example, corporations could opt out of
many of the provisions of the recent Act,273 but they could not avoid
the labor contract'provisions. 274 Thus, even though many corpora-
tions have opted out of some of Pennsylvania's antitakeover stat-
utes, the collective bargaining provisions remain in effect against
both abusive and beneficial transactions. Because these enactments
discourage even beneficial transactions, they are overbroad and in-
appropriate as antitakeover provisions. 275
Beneficial acquisitions serve to benefit both business and labor.
Labor protection should not be so overbroad as to restrict these le-
gitimate and worthwhile transactions. The successorship doctrine
allows for an equitable balancing of corporate control and job pro-
tection. The recent state enactments do not. Legislatures should
not allow the presumed threats of a small portion of abusive acquisi-
tions to motivate antitakeover measures that seriously discourage
even beneficial, synergistic acquisitions.
In summary, the recent state enactments do not fulfill the inten-
tions of the legislatures. Labor protection, though of questionable
necessity, is, at best, weakly provided for by the provisions of these
enactments; they propose to protect only a small minority of em-
ployees and communities in atypical situations, but instead harm the
majority of employees and communities in typical situations. Take-
bargaining enactments "intensify the financial risk of going after Pennsylvania
companies.").
272 See supra notes 103-25 and accompanying text.
273 See, e.g., 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 (Purdon) (amending, inter alia, 15 PA. CoNs.
STAT. § 1721 (1990) to allow corporations to opt out of the changes to the state code
permitting boards to consider constituency interests along with shareholder interests).
274 See Klein & Greenbaum, supra note 175, at 5.
275 Delaware and Massachusetts, unlike Pennsylvania, did not restrict their statutes
to only one type of transaction. See supra note 268. Their statutes, therefore, are even
more overbroad than Pennsylvania's. Transactions that are abusive, beneficial, friendly,
or hostile are all treated the same. There is no attempt to restrict the effects only to
abusive takeovers, and thus, the Delaware and Massachusetts statutes are overbroad.
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over protection through these types of enactments, though some-
times necessary to prevent abusive takeovers, is both overbroad and
inconsistent with other antitakeover mechanisms. Such protection
is inconsistent because it conflicts with more effective and efficient
takeover legislation, and is overbroad because of its restrictive ef-
fects on beneficial transactions. Since these statutes fail to accom-
plish what their supporters intended, and often accomplish the
opposite, they should be repealed in favor of the more efficient and
equitable federal successorship, continuing employer, and alter ego
doctrines. Furthermore, even if these statutes did accomplish their
intended purposes, they would still be ineffective because they are
subject to pre-emption by congressionally enacted labor legislation.
B. The Recent Enactments are Pre-empted by Federal Labor
Law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states
that "[T]he Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law
of the Land." 276 Under this definition, if a state statute "create[s]
inconsistent duties" or "stand[s] as a substantial and unwarranted
obstacle" to the objectives of a federal statute, the state statute must
yield. 277 The purpose, of course, is clear: to avoid the "disparities,
confusions and conflicts which would follow if the Government's
general authority were subject to local controls." 278 This section
demonstrates that, under the Supremacy Clause, the NLRA279 pre-
empts the recent state enactments that attempt to control the pas-
sage of collective bargaining agreements during and after business
combination transactions. 280
Federal pre-emption of state law generally follows one or more
of four confusing and overlapping theories, two of which do not ap-
ply here.281 The two theories that do apply here are often combined
276 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
277 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439, 445 (7th Cir. 1989).
278 United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
279 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
280 One commentator has suggested this in passing. See William H. DuRoss III, In-
creasing the Labor-Related Costs of Business Transfers and Acquisitions-The Spectre of Per Se Lia-
bility for New Owners, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 375, 409 n.185 (1989). This section of the Note
develops this argument.
281 See Palmer v. Liggett Group, 825 F.2d 620, 624 (Ist Cir. 1987) (Many court hold-
ings "list, but do not describe .... [or] ... define, any real distinctions among the
various types of preemption."); see also Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 833
F.2d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1987) ("these guides are easier to state than apply ... ").
The first preemption theory applies when Congress has enacted legislation explic-
itly stating the extent to which it intends to preempt state law. See Michigan Canners &
Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984) ("[I]n
enacting the federal law, Congress may explicitly define the extent to which it intends to
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into one theory. 28 2 Under this combined theory, state law is pre-
empted when it trespassses into an area of law with respect to which
Congress intended to "occupy the field," 283 or when it "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." 284 Even though the NLRA does not
explicitly state that it occupies the whole field of labor relations, 28 5
this Note argues that Congress intended to at least occupy the field
of collective bargaining. The recent state enactments conflict with
this dimension of the NLRA and with numerous objectives and poli-
cies underlying the Act and, therefore, should be pre-empted by the
NLRA.
1. These Recent State Enactments Interfere with the Occupied Field
of Collective Bargaining and Conflict with the Purposes and
Objectives of Congress
One of Congress's main objectives in the passage of the NLRA
was the promotion of collective bargaining. In fact, the findings and
declarations of policy in the preamble to the NLRA explicitly state
that its purpose was to "encourag[e] the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining. ' 28 6 Courts throughout the years have consist-
ently reaffirmed that this was a fundamental purpose of the NLRA
pre-empt state law."). This theory is inapplicable to this Note because the NLRA does
not specifically state the extent to which it supplants state intervention in labor law. See,
e.g., Metropolitan life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) ("[Ihe
NLRA contains no statutory pre-emption provision.").
The second theory applies when an explicit facial conflict exists between federal and
state legislation. L at 747 (State regulation yields if "it conflicts with federal law."); see
also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 874 F.2d at 445 ("If a federal and a state statute create inconsis-
tent duties, the state statute must of course give way."). This theory is also inapplicable
to this Note because the NLRA does not explicitly mandate or disallow collective-bar-
gaining agreements passing to the new employer in a business-control transaction.
282 The theories have been described as very similar and difficult to separate. See
Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 69,
71 (1988) ("[Tihe Court's pronouncement that state laws must yield if they 'stand as an
obstacle' to a congressional objective is functionally indistinguishable from the Court's
holding that state laws are ousted when Congress 'occupies the field.' ").
283 See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747-48 (State legislation yields when the courts
"'discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field
to the exclusion of the States.'" (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
209 (1985))); see also Michigan Canners, 467 U.S. at 469 ("Congress may indicate an intent
to occupy an entire field of regulation, in which case the States must leave all regulatory
activity in that area to the Federal Government.").
284 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747 ("[C]ourts sustain a local regulation 'unless it... would
frustrate the federal scheme.' . . ." (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209)).
285 Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 208 ("Congress ... has never exercised authority to
occupy the entire field in the area of labor legislation .....
286 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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and accordingly have acted in furtherance of that purpose. 28 7
One premise of collective bargaining is that neither party is
compelled to agree to any substantive provision.288 The legislative
history of the NLRA shows that Congress intended that parties re-
main free to decide whether or not to accept any or all provisions
that arise out of a free and fair bargaining process. 289 Governmen-
tal power was extended only to the supervision of the bargaining
process, not to imposition of the substantive terms.290 This means
that employers and employees are to bargain, without governmental
imposition of terms, 291 under normal considerations of contractual
freedom, 292 in order to arrive at an agreement based on "the free
play of economic forces" 295 without state "restrictions on economic
weapons of self-help." 294
The recent state enactments conflict not only with every aspect
of this policy, but with the basic premise of the policy itself: to pro-
mote the practices and procedures of the collective bargaining pro-
287 NLRB v. Norfolk S. Bus Corp., 159 F.2d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 1946) ("[One of the
purposes of [the NLRA] is to encourage collective bargaining."), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
844 (1947); NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc., 620 F.2d 367, 376 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Mhe funda-
mental policy of the Act [is] to encourage collective bargaining .. "); Houston Shop-
ping News Co. v. NLRB, 554 F.2d 739, 745 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The purpose of the NLRA
is to encourage collective bargaining .... ).
288 Section 8(d) of the NLRA defines collective bargaining as the "performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith ... I but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1988).
289 See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935) ("It must be stressed that the
duty to bargain collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, be-
cause the essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide
whether proposals made to it are satisfactory.").
290 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) ("Allowing the [NLRB] to
compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the
fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under governmen-
tal supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual
terms of the contract.").
291 See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972) ("Bargaining free-
dom means both that [employer and union] need not make any concessions as a result of
Government compulsion and that they are free from having contract provisions imposed
upon them against their will."); H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 108 ("[T]he fundamental prem-
ise on which the Act is based [is] private bargaining under governmental supervision of
the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the con-
tract."); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) ("The Act does
not compel agreements between employers and employees . . . [or] any agreement
whatever.").
292 H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 108 (1970) ("One of the fundamental policies of [the
NLRA] is freedom of contract.").
293 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614 (1986)
(citing Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140
(1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971))).
294 Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19 (1987).
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cess. These statutes explicitly state that "[n]o . . . business
combination shall result in the termination or impairment of the
provisions of any ... [organized] labor contract." 295 The statutes
impose on the respective parties contractual provisions to which
they never agreed, which directly conflicts with the noninterference
policies of the NLRA. Even though the statutes may promote col-
lective bargains by continuing their substantive provisions, they deter
collective bargaining by interfering with the practices and procedures
of the bargaining process itself. The purpose of the NLRA was the
promotion of collective bargaining, not the blind enforcement of
collective bargains.
Under the provisions of these state statutes, however, collective
bargaining will not occur at all unless both sides agree to bargain.296
In most situations, one side or the other will hold the right to en-
force what it will consider beneficial contract provisions. Therefore,
it will refuse to bargain and the other party will be powerless to ob-
ject, bargain, or appeal.297 Because the parties are effectively re-
strained from bargaining, and because one party will usually have
contractual provisions foisted upon it, the statutes restrict the invo-
cation of "economic weapons of self-help" and disallow any "free
play of economic forces." Economic forces enjoy no "free play"
when states attempt to completely disallow any "play" whatsoever.
Economic weapons of self-help can never be employed when states
do not even allow the parties to get to the battlefield. These effects
conflict with the policies of the NLRA to promote collective bargain-
ing under principles of contractual freedom.
The burdensome economic effects of the recent state enact-
ments also conflict with promotion of collective bargaining. These
enactments place economic burdens on acquisitions, both friendly
and hostile, and reduce the likelihood of a completed transaction. 29 8
Management has incentives to leave open the opportunity for ac-
cepting future acquisition proposals. Therefore, it will attempt to
avoid the absolute restrictions of these statutes. Although manage-
ment cannot directly avoid these statutes, it can try to minimize its
exposure to their effects in two ways. First, it can try to avoid collec-
295 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 706 (1989); accord MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 20E
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); 1990 Pa. Legis Serv. 36 (Purdon) (enacting § 2587).
296 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 19, § 706(a) (1989) ("[S]uch labor contract shall continue
in effect... until otherwise agreed by the parties to such contract or their legal succes-
sors."); accord MASS ANN. Laws ch. 149, § 20E (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); 1990 Pa. Legis
Serv. 36 (Purdon) (enacting § 2587).
297 Either labor or management can have the agreement imposed on them against
their wishes. See supra notes 205-12 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 236-37, 267-72 and accompanying text.
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tive bargaining altogether.299 If management can break its employ-
ees' union and avoid bargaining agreements altogether, it can
minimize the risk of losing future opportunities to sell out. Manage-
ment, therefore, has real incentives to avoid bargaining whenever
and however possible.300
Second, management can take serious steps to reduce the po-
tency of its employees' bargaining agreements. The less oppressive
the agreements are from a management perspective, the less threat-
ening the agreements will appear to potential friendly acquirors.
Management, therefore, will be under tremendous pressure to mini-
mize the potency of any concessions that it has to make, and to
avoid making any concessions at all. In effect, these statutes provide
extra incentives for management to fight with labor over every sin-
gle provision. This directly conflicts with the policy of the NLRA of
"encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes." 30'
Thus, the effects of the recent state enactments directly and vio-
lently oppose the NLRA policies of promoting collective bargaining
under principles of contractual freedom. The federal doctrines, on
the other hand, as developed by the NLRB and the federal courts
through interpretation and application of the NLRA, actually pro-
mote collective bargaining. Furthermore, the federal doctrines en-
force collective bargains, but only when doing so furthers the
policies underlying the NLRA. In contrast to the successorship doc-
trine that promotes bargaining in accordance with the policies of the
NLRA,30 2 the recent state enactments actually deter collective bar-
gaining and impose terms not agreed to by the employer or employ-
ees. In contrast to the continuing employer and alter ego doctrines
that appropriately enforce collective bargains when the "new" em-
ployer is really the same entity,303 the recent state enactments en-
299 Refusal to conduct good-faith bargaining is of course illegal. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1988); see also STEVEN I. SCHLOSSBERG &JUDrrH A. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND
THE LAw 97, 103 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing the illegality of employers refusals to bargain
in good faith). Management can, however, attempt to disguise its activity or indirectly
weaken the union, and the recent statutes will only promote such activities.
300 The counter argument is that management rushes out to bargain even more be-
cause it wants takeover protection for self-entrenchment. See supra notes 251-55 and
accompanying text. Management, however, will want to waive or remove its takeover
protections when a really attractive deal comes along or when management itself seeks
to consummate a deal with a "wanted" suitor. For example, poison pill plans usually
allow boards to redeem otherwise exercisable dilutive share rights if a deal is attractive.
The recent state enactments do not allow for this flexibility, however, and management
will not have extra incentives to bargain just to cover itself with the rigid takeover pro-
tections these enactments provide.
301 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
302 See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 103-25 and accompanying text.
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force collective bargains even when the new employer is a totally
separate entity, providing a completely different employment envi-
ronment that would not give rise to reasonable expectations of con-
tinued contract enforcement. Furthermore, the recent state
enactments enforce collective bargaining agreements even when the
enforcement of those agreements would actually harm the employ-
ees that the agreements were originally designed to protect.30 4
Therefore, the recent state enactments conflict with the policies of
the NLRA by interfering with the practices and procedures of the
collective bargaining process and by rigidly protecting collective
bargains, even though new bargains and agreements would better
serve the underlying policies of the NLRA. Consequently, the
courts should strike these statutes down as directly conflicting with,
and, therefore, pre-empted by the NLRA under the mandates of the
Supremacy Clause.
2. These Recent State Enactments Interfere with the Establishment
and Maintenance of Equal Bargaining Power and Conflict
with the Purposes and Objectives of Congress
Another fundamental purpose of the NLRA was the establish-
ment and maintenance of equal bargaining power between labor
and management. The basic objective of the NLRA was to redress
"[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees ... and
employers ."305 by balancing "protection, prohibition, and lais-
sez-faire." 30 6 The Supreme Court has limited almost all state activ-
ity that alters this balance of bargaining power 30 7 and recently has
304 See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
305 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 753 (1985); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965) ("[A]
primary purpose of the [NLRA] was to redress the perceived imbalance of economic
power between labor and management .. "); Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d
716, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) ("The [NLRA] ... was designed to overcome the inequality of
bargaining power between employees and employers.").
306 Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 140 n.4 (1976) (quoting Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1337, 1352 (1972)).
307 See Wisconsin Dep't of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986); Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 613-18 (1986); Machinists v.
Wisconsin Bd., 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see also
Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unioniza-
tion, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990) ("The Supreme Court's opinions concerning the
NLRA's preemptive effect appear to foreclose any deliberate state effort to influence the
relative balance of power between employers and unions."); Wolfson, supra note 282, at
79 ("The doctrine of 'Machinists preemption' currently protects the balance established
by Congress between management and labor in the collective bargaining process by
precluding state regulation of the peaceful economic weapons available to both sides.").
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upheld precedent that disallows states from altering this balance. 08
Even more recently, the Court held that a city regulation was pre-
empted under the NLRA because it destroyed the balance of power
designed by Congress and frustrated congressional intention of al-
lowing for the application of economic weapons of self-help.30 9
The recent state enactments destroy the balance of bargaining
power established by the NLRA because the balance shifts depend-
ing upon whom the agreements benefit. When the provisions bene-
fit labor, it has all the power, but when the provisions benefit
management, it has all the power.310 Total power vests in the party
that has the most to gain. Therefore, these recent enactments
should be pre-empted because their provisions upset the equitable
bargaining balance established by Congress in the NLRA.
3. These Recent State Enactments Interfere with the Establishment
and Maintenance of Uniform, Nationwide Treatment of
Labor and Conflict with the Purposes and Objectives of
Congress
The establishment of uniform, nationwide treatment of both la-
bor and labor agreements was another fundamental policy goal of
the NLRA. Congress sought to obtain uniform application of the
NLRA's substantive rules and to avoid the conflicts likely to result
from a variety of local procedures. 31' The recent enactments, how-
ever, would establish very different treatment of labor and labor
agreements among the various states. In Delaware, Massachusetts,
and Pennsylvania, labor agreements would pass to new employers in
every business combination,3 12 but in other states, they would not.
For example, if an asset sale of a major corporation includes
both a Pennsylvania manufacturing plant and a New Jersey process-
ing plant, the Pennsylvania workers' agreement will be protected
308 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 751 (1985) ("Con-
gress determined both how much the conduct of unions and employers should be regu-
lated, and how much it should be left unregulated: 'The States have no more authority
than the Board to upset the balance that Congress has struck between labor and man-
agement in the collective-bargaining relationship.'" (quoting New York Telephone v.
New York Labor Dep't, 440 U.S. 519, 554 (1979)(dissenting opinion)).
309 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
310 See supra notes 205-14, 235-37 and accompanying text.
311 See Golden State Transit v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110 (1989) ("[S]tatejuris-
diction over conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA is pre-empted in the
interest of maintaining uniformity in the administration of the federal regulatory juris-
diction."); see also NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971) ("The purpose of
the [NLRA] was to obtain 'uniform application' of its substantive rules and to avoid the
'diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes
toward labor controversies.'" (quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union Local No. 7761, 346
U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
312 See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
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but the New Jersey workers' agreement will not. Such a situation
could easily incite labor unrest, especially because the two plants
could be directly across the river from each other.313 As previously
discussed, the federal doctrines promote the policies of the NLRA
by treating all labor agreements equally and by balancing the com-
peting equities to avoid industrial labor strife.3 14 The recent state
enactments, however, actually contradict this policy of uniformity
and threaten to promote labor strife; they should, therefore, be pre-
empted by the NLRA. 3 15
313 Consider an even messier situation. Acquiror purchases the'assets ofbothA and
B and combines them into a new enterprise, at a new location, so that their origins are
indistinguishable. Acquiror then hires approximately one quarter of both A's and B s
former employees to comprise somewhat less than half of its new workforce and hires
somewhat more than a half of its new workforce from outside the transaction. Under the
requirements of the reeent state enactments, A's former employees retain their old con-
tract and union, and B's former employees retain theirs. In this situation, two employ-
ees, working side-by-side on possibly the same equipment, have different union
representation under different contracts. Furthermore, the "outside" employees that
make up more than half of the new workforce may want to form their own bargaining
unit represented by another union. If they are allowed to do so, then there will be three
unions, three contracts, and three times the confusion. Under the federal doctrines, this
situation would be resolved according to majority status of the workforce with the result
being one union and one contract for all the workers. See supra notes 47-50 and accom-
panying text. The policies and procedures of the NLRA will necessarily have to pre-
empt the recent state enactments so as to retain uniformity of representation and to
avert a splintering of labor power and the resulting labor discontent or unrest.
314 See supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text. See also notes 129-34 and accom-
panying text (The federal doctrines disregard state law that would alter the uniformity
secured under the federal analysis.).
315 The nonuniform favor that these enactments grant to in-state labor might also be
considered a form of state protectionism subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny. Protec-
tionism is a policy of governmental economic protection that benefits domestic produ-
cers at the expense of nondomestic producers. See New Energy Co. of Indiana v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-274 (1988). The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion prohibits such protectionism unless the discriminatory results are "demonstrably
justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism." Id at 269. Even when
a state's statute "regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
... [statutes will not be upheld if] the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
The recent state enactments discussed in this Note may be unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause due to their protectionist motivations and effects. The statutes
were enacted to protect in-state employment. See Hearings on Senate Bill No. 1310, supra
note 175, at 1-28 (various witnesses testifying how the statute would preserve thejobs of
Pennsylvania employees). This in-state protection, however, may come at the expense
of out-of-state employees. Thus, even though the statutes are not facially protectionist,
they yield protectionist results. See also supra note 192.
These statutes burden interstate commerce because "[t]he reallocation of economic
resources to their highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and compe-
tition, is hindered." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). Since these stat-
utes limit business combinations transactions, assets that could be used more efficiently
in other parts of the country will either continue to be used inefficiently or be removed
from productive use altogether. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
In order to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny the putative local benefits related
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4. The States' Power to Enact "Peripheral" Legislation Relating to
"Deeply Rooted" Local Concerns is Not Applicable to These
Recent Enactments
States can enact labor legislation when the effects of such legis-
lation are "peripheral" to the NLRA or when the issue involved is
such a "deeply rooted" local concern that it cannot be inferred that
Congress intended to limit state powers in that area.3 16 Thus, the
United States Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Mas-
sachusetts3 17 upheld a state enactment that defined and mandated
that employers provide health insurance coverage to employees who
were covered by the NLRA. 318 The Court reasoned that the state
legislation affected union and nonunion employees equally, did not
alter the balance of power between the parties, and neither en-
couraged nor discouraged the collective bargaining processes con-
trolled by the NLRA. 319 Furthermore, the Court found that these
laws were minimum standards "independent of the collective-bar-
gaining process" and, therefore, not pre-empted by the NLRA.320
The recent labor contracts enactments, however, are distin-
guishable from the state law at issue in Metropolitan Life. First, inter-
ference with collective bargaining agreements does not qualify as a
"peripheral concern" of the NLRA and is not "deeply rooted in lo-
to in-state job preservation will have to outweigh this burden. The benefits are protec-
tion of employee expectations, the local economy, the local community, and the local
cultural and charitable values. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. These same
benefits, however, are lost to the out-of-state employees and communities that will lose
potential jobs and business development due to the restrictions of the recent state enact-
ments. Therefore, the in-state benefits gained are offset by the out-of-state benefits lost,
and the net global effect is equalized; there are little, if any, real benefits.
Furthermore, this Note argues that these recent statutes will not provide the in-state
labor-protection benefits that they were intended to provide. See supra notes 199-204
and accompanying text. Therefore, "there is nothing to be weighed in the balance" to
compensate for the burden they impose on interstate commerce. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644.
Under this analysis these statutes may not withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny.
316 See Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 676 (1983)
("When... the conduct at issue is only a peripheral concern of the Act or touches on
interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of com-
pelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to de-
prive the State of the power to act, [the Court will] refuse to invalidate state regulation
or sanction of the conduct."); Mayon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 805 F.2d 1250, 1252
(5th Cir. 1986) ("Preemption ...is not applied to state regulation that affects [the]
federal scheme only peripherally or involves deeply held local concerns."); Sheet Metal
Workers v. Carter, 212 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) ("[T]he States [have] the
power to regulate any matter of 'peripheral concern' to the NLRA or ... conduct that
touches interests 'deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.' " (quoting Taggart
v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 228 (1969)), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1078 (1976)).
317 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
318 Id.
319 Id. at 754-55.
320 Id. at 755.
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cal feeling and responsibility."3 21 Labor agreements are a direct
concern of the NLRA and are to be regulated by Congress, not the
states. Second, these enactments directly impinge on the collective
bargaining process; they discourage collective bargaining,3 22 upset
the balance of bargaining power among the parties,3 23 and disturb
national uniformity within the labor system.3 24 Third, these enact-
ments treat union and nonunion employees very differently by con-
tinuing the collective bargaining agreements of union employees
but ignoring the privately bargained contracts of nonunion employ-
ees. In total, the recent enactments are not concerned with "periph-
eral" issues like "minimum labor standards,"3 25 and therefore fall
outside the pre-emption exception of Metropolitan Life.
In summary, these enactments encroach on an area of law that
Congress intended to occupy and conflict with the inherent policies
of congressional legislation. These enactments contradict NLRA
policies by discouraging collective bargaining, by interfering with
the establishment and maintenance of equal bargaining power be-
tween labor and management, and by interfering with the establish-
ment of uniform nationwide treatment of labor and labor
agreements. Finally, these enactments fall outside of the "periph-
eral concern" exception, the "local concern" exception, and the re-
cently-developed "minimum standards" exception to pre-emption.
Therefore, courts should strike down these enactments as unconsti-
tutional infringements on validly exercised federal power under the
pre-emption authority of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The NLRB and the federal courts have developed three theo-
ries to deal with labor responsibilities during and after business
combinations.3 26 These theories look to "continuity" in the em-
ployment relationship to determine the post-transaction rights and
responsibilities of employees and employers. The federal doctrines
attempt to balance the employers' freedom to make business deci-
sions and manage resources with the employees' reasonable expec-
tations regarding job security and employment benefits.
321 Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 676 (1983).
322 See supra notes 295-301 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 305-10 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
325 "Minimum state labor standards affect union and nonunion employees equally,
and neither encourage nor discourage the collective-bargaining processes that are the
subject of the NLRA." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755
(1985).
326 See supra notes 22-125 and accompanying text.
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States such as Delaware, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, how-
ever, are striking out on their own. These states have enacted
legislation that mandate the continuation of collective-bargaining
agreements regardless of the circumstances. 327 These enactments
are bold reversals of the federal judicial doctrines and, if enforced,
would institute broad changes in the ways corporations and busi-
nesses will have to look at combinational transactions. Not only
would acquiring businesses have to consider the content of the pre-
vious employers' bargaining agreements, but they would also have
to consider where the employees would be located and how the dif-
ferent laws of the different locations would affect the total transac-
tion costs and consequences.
This Note has argued that states that have not enacted these
recent statutes should not consider doing so, and states that have
enacted them should repeal them. These enactments fail to effectu-
ate their respective legislatures' intentions. 328 Instead, they unnec-
essarily interfere with legitimate business transactions and harm
labor, business and society. Perhaps most condemning, these enact-
ments directly conflict with the policies and principles of the NLRA.
On this basis courts should strike down these enactments as uncon-
stitutional intrusions on validly exercised federal power under the
authority of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. 329
The federal doctrines of the NLRB and the federal courts pro-
vide a nationally consistent and equitably balanced method of deal-
ing with labor obligations during and after business combination
transactions. States should not enact, and courts should not allow
states to maintain, protectionist legislation that abandons the poli-
cies, principles, methods, and results of federal labor policy.
Marcus Paul Efthimiou t
327 See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
328 See supra notes 172-275 and accompanying text.
329 See supra notes 276-325 and accompanying text.
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